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THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE:
A PLAINTIFFS VIEW
WILLIAm H. DEPARcQ*
The predominant feature of the rules of evidence now in force
in Minnesota, whether they are outgrowths of the ancient principles
of the common law or are inventions of recent legislatures, is that
they are exclusionary in nature. Rules, doctrines, and concepts
limiting and prohibiting evidence are far more numerous than are
those which allow evidence to be admitted. Judge Loevinger's valuable mbnograph takes 24 pages to state the exclusionary rules in
the most' summary fashion.- Very few pages, indeed, would be
needed to state the rules, doctrines, and concepts permitting evidence to be admitted.
All of us--even lawyers-are creatures of environment and
heredity. Thus it is not surprising that lawyers who consistently
represent injured persons should develop different attitudes toward
questions, of evidence 'than lawyers who represent the insurance
companies, the railroads, and the other vast corporate enterprises
who may be legally responsible for the injury. All of us would
agree that the goal of evidence rules should be the reliable and
expeditious ascertainment of the truth. Our experience and our
professional concerns lead us to disagreement as to which policies
will best effectuate this goal.
The plaintiff has the, burden of proof; he who makes the claim
must prove it. Normally, therefore, the plaintiff has the affirmative
of the issue and must establish it with proof. If there is no evidence,
the defendant wins. If there is evidence but plaintiff is not able to
have it admitted, the defendant wins. And the defendant, if he is
thus successful in blocking and frustrating the plaintiff's attempt to
prove his case, wins quite regardless of what the merits of the claim
may be. For this reason it is only natural that plaintiff's lawyers
should be more liberal in their attitudes toward the admission of
evidence.
Of course this question is not all black or all white. There are
timeg when a plaintiffs lawyer is glad to use indirection rather than
direct evidence. That which you suggest is frequently more potent
than that which you prove. A woman fully clothed, but with her
*Member of Minnesota and Illinois bars. Chairman, Court Rules Committee, Minnesota State Bar Association. (I acknowledge with gratitude the
assistance of Professor Charles Alan Wright in providing me with documen-

tation for my views. W.H.D.)

1. Loevinger, The Minnesota Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1949),

reprinted in Minnesota Statutes Annotated, 1954 Cure. Supp., 27-51.
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thigh accidentally exposed, is far more alluring than the same
female in a bikini. This subtle power of suggestion, or this power
of subtle suggestion, also pervades the field of evidence. Perhaps
that is why so many lawsuits are said to hinge upon the "intangibles"
or the "imponderables." Verdicts and awards in states which allow
the direct joinder of insurance companies, as in Louisiana and
Visconsin, are notoriously low compared to states where this information trickles through to the jury only through the power
of suggestion, as indirectly during the voir dire. Likewise I would
not now repeat my youthful mistake of jeopardizing a verdict by
asking plaintiff in a personal injury action if he has a family 2 It Is
better psychology, as well as sounder law, to have him remain silent
on the stand but sit down with his wife and children in the courtroom when he has finished his testimony I
And again there are some circumstances in which defendant
wants to get evidence in, and the plaintiff would like to exclude it.
In proving contributory negligence or establishing a counterclaim
the defendant's counsel finds himself clothed with the attributes and
the duties of a plaintiff's lawyer. Twenty-five years ago the Minnesota Supreme Court overruled its extraordinary earlier decisions
and adopted the common sense rule that the same requirements
exist in establishing the contributory negligence of plaintiff as in
establishing the negligence of the defendant.' There may well have
been occasions when a plaintiff's lawyer, seeking to confound proof
of contributory negligence, has been every bit as technical in his
objections to evidence as was counsel for the defendant during the
presentation of plaintiff's case.
The same thing is true of counterclaims. But the overwhelming
majority of defendants' lawyers today have insurance companies
for their real clients. Their primary interest and loyalty is to the
real client who butters their parsnips. Their main concern is to defeat plaintiff's claim, and the outmoded and overtechnical rules of
evidence still frequently applied are important weapons in their
arsenal.
For these reasons the average plaintiff's lawyer is a disciple of
Wigmore who condemned most of the rules ofevidence about which
2. Thomson v. Boles, 123 F 2d 487, 494-495 (8th Cir. 1941).
3. Mechler v. McMahon, 184 Minn. 476, 239 N. W 605 (1931). In
WoJtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 1 N. W 2d 409 (1942), Justice Stone
carried this to what seems to me an indefensible extreme by holding that
defendant is entitled to a directed verdict on the issue of contributory negligence if plaintiff fails to show a sufficient convincing reason for his violation
of some trivial detail of the Highway Safety Act.
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he wrote so learnedly, and who was shocked by the number of reversals on evidentiary rulings, saying:
".. . the rules to a large extent fail of their professed purpose.
They serve, not as needful tools for helping the truth at trials,
but as game-rules, afterwards, for setting aside the verdict."'
And plaintiff's lawyers applaud, as a hope for the future even if
not an accurate statement of the state of affairs today, the statement that,
"the modem tendency is to give as wide a scope as possible to
the investigation of facts-to admit evidence freely, leaving it to
the jury to determine its weight." 5
The Uniform Rules of Evidence should be welcomed by plaintiff's attorneys. By their very existence they provide a stimulus to
reexamination and change in the law of evidence, and it is hard to
believe that any change can help but be for the good. And the Uniform Rules themselves are, on the whole, in line with what the
plaintiff's lawyer thinks the modem tendency should be. They
make important advances in the direction of liberality in admission
of evidence. And, much like the Federal and Minnesota Rules of
Civil Procedure, they seek to mitigate the inexcusable flood of reversals on evidentiary points by leaving many things to the discretion of the trial judge, rather than setting out a detailed and inflexi6
ble rule.
But the Uniform Rules do not need to be swallowed whole or
rejected entirely. In commercial law a principal objective of uniform
laws is uniformity. A business transaction may have incidents in
several different states, or a company may operate in different jurisdictions. It is desirable that the same law should govern in each
state, and there is a strong presumption that any tinkering by the
legislature is unwise and undesirable when adopting such a uniform
law. But procedural codes, such as the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
are a different matter. Their effect is confined exclusively to an
event, the trial of a law suit, which occurs in but one state. There is
no inherent advantage in having the same rules of evidence in
Minnesota as in Wisconsin or North Dakota. And so a state such
as Minnesota, if and when it considers adoption of the Uniform
4. 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 8c (3d ed. 1940). Similar expressions, by
other famous scholars of the law of evidence, are collected in Davis, Evidence Reform: The Administrative Proess Leads the WVays 34 Minn. L.
Rev. 581, 582-584 (1950).
5. 7 Dunnell's Digest § 3251.
6. For a caveat as to this 'trend by an able practicing attorney now
distinguished also as a scholar, see Louisell, Book Review, 37 Minn. L Rev.
643, 645-646 (1953). Professor Loulsell argues that if trial judges are to be
given the wide discretion contemplated by modern procedure, there is a heavy
obligation on the bar to improve the caliber of the trial bench.
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Rules, is free to consider whether certain changes in them would
not be desirable in order to preserve satisfactory Minnesota practices or settled Minnesota policies. Of course the ability and industry
of the distinguished committee which drafted the Uniform Rules
compels respect. And we must avoid the danger, so common in state
procedural reform, of mistaking mere habit for proof of merit.,
But where there is a clear showing that a provision of the Uniform
Rules is less desirable, for Minnesota, than the present Minnesota
practice, there need be no reluctance in making an appropriate
change in the Uniform Rules prior to their adoption here.8
The adoption of the Rules in Minnesota faces but one serious
obstacle. It seems clear enough that the supreme court is empowered
to prescribe rules of evidence under the enabling act of 1947 which
authorized the court to regulate practice and procedure in civil
actions.9 But the court has no rulemaking power for criminal actions.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence are intended to apply both to civil
and criminal actions, and it would be most confusing if any other
course were followed. Legislative action, authorizing the court to
make rules of evidence in criminal cases, seems, therefore, needed.
In the light of these general comments, let us turn now to an
examination of those rules which are of greatest interest to a plaintiff's lawyer. My discussion is divided into eight topics identical
with those into which the Uniform Rules are themselves divided.
GENERAL PROVISIONS (Rules 1 to 8)
Perhaps most important of the eight introductory rules is Rule 7,
which in sweeping terms abolishes all disqualifications of witnesses,
all privileges, and provides that "all relevant evidence is admissible."
The importance of this rule is illustrated by the fact that it puts
an end to the dead man's statute ;10oRule 7 declares that every per7

See Wright, Modern Pleading and the Pennsylvania Rules, 101 U. Pa.

L. Rev. 909 (1953). The classic example is the study in Morgan et al., The
Law of Evidence c. 3 and app. A-D (1927). Lawyers of New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, questioned with respect to the three strikingly
different attitudes toward the admissibility in evidence of declarations of deceased persons, all believed firmly that only the attitude of their own jurisdiction was sound. See Delefield v. Blockdel Realty Co., 128 F 2d 85, 93 (2d
Cir. 1942), Vanderbilt, Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration 338341, 572, 573 589 (1949).
8. "Uniformity of evidence rules in the different states, though desirable, is not of urgent practical importance.
" McCormick, Some High
Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 Tex. L. Rev. 559, 572 (1955) For
a contrary view, see Note, A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence
and Illinois Evidence Law, 49 Nw. U. L. Rev. 481, 482 (1954).
9. Institute of Judicial Administration, Rule-Making Power of the
Courts 63-67 (1955), Stein, To What Extent May Courts Under the RuleMaking Power PrescribeRules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 639 (1940).
10. Minn. Stat. § 595.04 (1953).
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son is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify
to any matter and none of the other rules restore the disqualification
which the dead man's statute formerly granted.
Of course, Rule 7 is limited by the seemingly innocuous statement, "except as otherwise provided in these Rules." And the remaining rules do restore many of the privileges, disqualifications,
and inadmissibility which Rule 7 purports to abolish. Nevertheless
Rule 7 does express the general philosophy of this whole set of rules,
and in a leisurely system of jurisprudence where time and expense
are immaterial it might be that no other rule would be necessary
Then we could determine the exclusionary rules by defining the
words used in Rule 7 This makes relevancy the whole test. Who
can object to this? Modem methods of education and communication have made the average juror far more knowledgeable than he
ever has been in the past, and the theory that the judge must protect
him from baleful influences is much less tenable. Rule 7, embodying
something of this thinking, points accusingly to every claimed limitation on admissibility and discretion, and places on these limitations the burden of justifying their existence.
Rules 4 and 5 state in somewhat detailed form that there are to
be no reversals because of erroneous admission or exclusion of
evidence, except where timely objection was made showing specifically the reasons for objecting, and where the error "probably had
a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict or finding."
Though these rules are desirable, it is doubtful if they wil produce
any important difference in appellate attitudes from those already
required by the "harmless error" doctrine,u and it might have been
better, if only in the interest of verbal purity, to use the same terminology as in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
The only provision in this section of the rules about which I
have doubts is Rule 1(13), which gives "writing" a sufficiently
broad definition to include plats, X-rays, photographs, or even
Egyptian hieroglyphics "or combinations thereof." The rule is
unobjectionable so long as it stands as a definition to be used only
when interpreting the Uniform Rules of Evidence. My fear is this:
Minn. R. Civ. P. 26.02 creates complete immunity from discovery
11. Minn. R. Civ. P. 61, which continues the policy of Minn. Stat.
§ 544.33. See Wright, Minnesota Rules 354 (1954); 3 Youngquist & Blacik,
Minnesota Rules Practice 309-433 (1953). The doctrine of "harmless error"
was carried to an extreme in one of those curiosities which make law such
a delightul profession. See State v. Corey, 182 Minn. 48, 233 N. V 590
(1930), where it was held error to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal
case, but only '%armless error" since, in the view of the Supreme Court, the
defendant was guilty!
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for any "writing" prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial. The Rules of Civil Procedure do not define "writing." If the Supreme Court should adopt the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, what would be more natural than to apply to the word
"writing" in Minn. R. Civ P 26.02 the definition which the same
Court has promulgated in the Uniform Rules of Evidence. This
would be extremely undesirable. Plaintiff's lawyers-and many unbiased scholarsl'-would be happiest if the immunity from discovery
created by Minn. R. Civ P 26.02 were completely abolished. Any
such restriction on discovery is at war with great policies of modern procedure to avoid surprise and get to the truth. The United
States Supreme Court has found it possible to preserve the adversary
system by a restriction on discovery far less sweeping than that
which Minnesota has chosen.' 3
Of course Minn. R. Civ P 26.02 should be dealt with on its
own merits, and not limited by indirection. But no more should
it be expanded by indirection. The definition of "writing" in Rule
1(13) of the evidence rules is far broader than that which courts
have applied in reading the same word in Rule 26.02 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure. Specifically, and most important, photographs
can be obtained by discovery at the present time under the civil
rules. 14 They will not be subject to discovery if this definition of
12. E.g., Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules,
36 Minn. L. Rev. 633, 635-639 (1952).

13. The landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495 (1947).

permits discovery of writings obtained in anticipation of litigation on a showing of substantial necessity and justification therefor. See 4 Moore's Federal
Practice § 26.23 (2d ed. 1950), Report of Proposed Amendments to the

Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, October,
1955, p. 40. For a brief discussion of the impact of Hickman v. Taylor on the
Minnesota Rules, see 2 Youngquist & Blacik, Minn. Rules Practice 25-26
(1953).
14. The leading Minnesota opinion is that of judge Loevinger in Rybak

v. Minnesota Mining and Manuacturing Co., Rules Comm. Op. No. 129, set

forth at length in Wright, Minnesota Rules 166-168 (1954). judge Weeks,

in the 4th District, has held to the same effect in Hartman v. S. S. Kresge Co.,
Rules Comm. Op. No. 160. Similar interpretations of the Federal Rules have
been made in the following cases Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Lauritzen,

182 F 2d 540 (6th Cir. 1950) , Helverson v. J. J. Newberry Co.. 16 F.R.D.
330 (W.D. Mo. 1954), Swallow v. Harrisburg Rys. Co., 99 F Supp. 305
(M.D. Pa. 1951), Pennsylvania R.R. v. Julian, 10 F.R.D. 452 (D.Del. 1950),
Simper v. Trimble, 9 F R. D. 598 (W.D. Mo. 1949), Cogdill v. Tennessee
Valley Authority, 7 F R. D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947) , Shields v. Sobelman, 64
F Supp. 619 (S.D. Pa. 1946), Dowd v American S. S. Co., 5 F R. D. 240

(W.D. N.Y. 1945) , Contra: Midland Steel Products Co. v. Clark Equipment
Co., 7 F R. D. 132 (W.D. Mich. 1945), Condry v. Buckeye S. S. Co.,
4 F R. D. 310 (W.D. Pa. 1945).

Judge Haering's opinion in Williams v. Chicago G.W Ry., Rules Comm.
Op. No. 212, that photographs are "writings" within the meaning of Minn.

R. Civ. P 26.02, and that therefore defendant need not anwser an interroga-
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"writing" now proposed should be read into the civil rules. Rule
1(13), if adopted, should be specifically limited in its application to
the evidence rules.
JuDicIAL

NOTICE (Rules 9 to 12)

In an earlier draft of this article, it was said of this section of the
rules: "These rules seem entirely unobjectionable.

. .

. [They]

wisely and properly set out a workable procedure by which common knowledge can be taken into account in the trial of a lawsuit."
I was wrong. The error resulted from the uncontroversial sound
of these rules, and by their resemblance to the similar provisions in
the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act and in the Model
Code of Evidence. Though I had a stomach reaction that judges
take into account a good many more facts than settled doctrines of
judicial notice would allow, it did not occur to me that the rules
might not reflect this.
Fortunately before finishing the article I read the masterful
discussion of this subject by Professor Davis.25 His conclusion is
that Rules 9 to 12 "are seriously and fundamentally unsound." He
persuades me entirely.
It would serve no purpose for me to restate the arguments
Professor Davis makes so well. But one of my own cases would be
affected by one of the proposed rules. In Lilly v. Grand Think
Western R. Co.1 6 the United States Supreme Court reversed an
Illinois court which had refused to take judicial notice of regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, made pursuant to the
Boiler Inspection Act and having the force of law in FELA actions.
This result would be overturned by the Uniform Rules. They permit judicial notice of "duly published regulations of governmental
subdivisions or agencies of this state,"17 but they do not authorize
judicial notice of regulations by federal agencies, and indeed they
prohibit the judge from taking judicial notice of material other than
that listed.1s The Lilly case was right and the rule is wrong.15 This
is perhaps an oversight in the rules, but they contain other errors
tory asking if he has any photographs of plaintiff, does not discuss these cases.
And in carrying the protection back from the photographs themselves to the
mere question of whether they exist, it ignores the settled rule that 26.02,
and the corresponding federal doctrine, apply only to the documents themselves, and do not protect information contained in the documents. 4 Moore's
Federal Practice 1146-47 (2d ed. 1950), Wright, Minnesota Rules 170 (1954).

15. Davis, JudicialNotice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945 (1955).
16. 317 U. S. 481 (1943).
17.

Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 9(2) (a).

18. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rules 10(3), 12(3).
19.

See also Davis, supra note 15, at 947.
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of a more fundamental nature which should be corrected before
they are adopted.
PRESUMPTIONS (Rules 13 to 16)

A leading authority on evidence is guilty of understatement
when he suggests that " 'presumption' is the slipperiest member of
the family of legal terms.

' 20

A penalty should be imposed on all

judges, legal scholars and lawyers who utter this confused and
confusing word. Dictionaries containing it ought to be burned.
While this may seem a facetious comment, newsprint would be
cheaper and printer's ink more available if some English monarch
had so decreed centuries ago-also jurisprudence would have been
richer and more sensible.
Early in professional life I had an experience with presumptions
that perhaps. is responsible for my destructive urge and has prejudiced me in favor of their abolition. In searching for an applicable
presumption and one that would solve my problem, I became lost
in an impenetrable fog (from which some may suggest I have not
yet emerged) The facts of my case were about midnight on a May
evening in 1935, Dr. Marvin Miller, the son of a prominent doctor
in a rural Minnesota community, was driving north from Bovey,
Minnesota. With him was his wife Florence, whom he had met while
interning in a hospital where she worked as a nurse. Florence had
a young daughter by a previous marriage. As the couple drove north
from Bovey on the night in question, the young doctor failed to
negotiate a curve successfully The car plunged over an abutment
to a bridge, turned a somersault, and landed top down in the waisthigh Prairie River. When the tragic scene was discovered the next
morning, Marvin's body was in a crouching position in the back
part of the car, his hair showing above the water. Florence was
found some 500 feet downstream, her clothing caught in a snag,
with face down and knees flexed. General rigor mortis had set in
both bodies.
This tragic occurence soon was the subject of litigation, for
Marvin had a $5000 insurance policy in which Florence was named
as beneficiary. If Florence died before Marvin, the money would
go to Marvin's estate and thus be inherited by his father. But if
Florence survived Marvin, her right to the money would have
vested, and it would pass in turn to her small daughter.
The fact is that no one knew, or could have known, whether
Marvin or Florence died first. It may be that one person was
20. McCormick, Evidence 639 (1954).
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killed instantly by the crash and the other drowned, but there was
no proof as to this. The autopsies were inconclusive. The court
held that the burden was on the wife's estate to prove that she
survived her husband, and that in the absence of proof either way
the money would go to Marvin's father. As counsel for Florence's
estate, I floundered around in the field of presumptions, searching
for one which would make up for the non-existent evidence. But the
court seemed to have no difficulty in following the majority rule
that where two persons perish in a common disaster, there is no
presumption that because of age, health, sex, or strength the one
survived the other, and it held for the father.2 '
Subsequent to this decision the legislature occupied the field by
the enactment in 1943 of the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act.22
In common catastrophes the gibberish of presumptions, whether of

law or fact, whether mandatory or permissive, has now vanished.
It is fortunate that in one area of Minnesota law confusion about
presumptions has been ended since 1943, for in other areas this con-

fusion is enjoying its finest hour.
There was a day when Minnesota lawyers and judges had no
particular difficulty with the two most common presumptions. We
knew that it was proper to instruct the jury that there is a strong
presumption against suicide,23 and we knew also that in death
cases, the jury should be instructed that there is a presumption that
the deceased exercised due care and was not contributorily negligent.24 Little-did we realize how well off we were in those halcyon
days.
In 1939 Justice Royal Stone undertook to "clarify" the law on
presumptions. In doing so he dealt Minnesota jurisprudence a
grievous blow from which it has not yet recovered. The case, of
course, is Ryan v. Metropolitan Life Insmrance Co. 2 5 Justice Stone
adopted, lock, stock and barrel the Thayer-Wigmore view that a
presumption vanishes as soon as any contrary evidence has been
introduced. Earlier decisions were overruled right and left to hold
that a presumption is not evidence, and that under usual circumstances it is error to mention a presumption to the jury where any
evidence contrary to the presumed fact has been introduced.
21. Miller v. McCarthy, 198 Minn. 497, 270 N. W. 559 (1936).
22. Mini. Stat. § 525.90 (1953).
23. G-arbush v. New York Life Ins Co., 172 Minn. 98, 214 N. NV. 795
(1927).
24.

Oxborough v. Murphy Transfer & Storage Co., 194 Minn. 335 260

N. W. 305 (1935) ; Gross-v. General Investment Co., 194 Mfinn. 23, 259 N. NV.
557 (1935) ; Jasinuk v. Lombard, 189 Minn. 594, 250 N. W 568 (1933).
25.

206 Minn. 562, 289 N. W 557 (1939).
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A law review commentator, peering into a somewhat clouded
crystal ball, hailed the decision as producing "a tremendous simplification of the presumption problem, thus performing a service of
incalculable value to members of both the bench and bar as well as
future jurors. ' 28 This "tremendous simplification" has produced 22

subsequent decisions explaining what is meant, very few of which
are to be regarded as consistent with any of the others. In 1940 it
was held technically incorrect to instruct the jury that decedent
enjoyed the presumption of due care, which had to be overcome by
the greater weight of the evidence before contributory negligence
could be found. But this was said to be harmless error since the
court didn't think decedent had been contributorily negligent.27
Three years later we were told that to allow the jury to be instructed
as to a presumption would be an elimination of the rule laid down
in the Ryan case, and that no rebuttable presumption should be
given to the jury 23
But in 1944 the instruction about a presumption, held never
permissible only a year before, became discretionary with the trial
court. In a FELA death case the court said
"Conceding that in the instant case there may have been some
evidence to justify the submission of the issue of contributory
negligence, yet the giving of the instruction [that there is a
presumption of due care]
.
was not reversible error. It is
common practice for trial courts to state propositions of law to
a jury, and not uncommon for them to refer to the presumption
of due care on the part of a party charged with negligence.
Granted that under the rule of the Ryan case a trial court, in its
discretion, may decline to refer to the presumption of due care on
the part of a decedent because it is a presumption of law rather
than one of fact, the giving of such instruction without objection
on the 29
part of either party cannot taint the jury's verdict with
error."
When the defendant hastily petitioned for rehearing, showing that
he had taken a proper exception to the charge, the court said there
was still
"[n]o reversible error, for, as pointed out in our original opinion,
there is nothing improper in a charge stating the presumption
of law-exception or no exception." 80
26. Note, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 651, 660 (1940). For another view as to the
clarity of the Ryan opinion, see companion article by Gausewitz.
27 Lang v. Chicago & N. W Ry., 208 Minn. 487,295 N. W 57 (1940).
28. Robert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 215 Minn. 300, 9 N. W 2d 730
(1943).
29. Bimberg v. Northern Pac. Ry., 217 Minn. 187, 197-98, 14 N. W 2d
410, 415 (1944).
30. Id. at 206, 14 N. W 2d at 419.

A PLAINTIFF'S VIEW

The same result was reached by a unanimous court in an action
3
under the state wrongful death act. '
A few years later the court held that it is not error to refuse
to instruct that there is a presumption of due care.3 2 Although the
holding is consistent with the two cases just cited, which had said
such an instruction is discretionary with the trial court, the court relied on a somewhat different line of reasoning. It pointed out that the
Ryan case had said the presumption vanishes when there is creditable
evidence to the contrary. And it explained the two cases just considered on the bizarre ground that the jury had shown by its verdict
that it did not believe defendant's eyewitness, and thus there was no
credible evidence to dispel the presumption!
The last word-until the next time the court gets a chance to

go off on a new tangent-is Te Poel v. Larson,33 where a verdict
for plaintiff was reversed, and a new trial ordered, because the trial
court had instructed that the deceased is presumed to have exercised
due care. In what Professor McCormick calls an "able opinion," 3'

the court announced that it was overruling many of its post-Ryan
decisions, though conveniently it did not list just which ones are
to be taken as overruled.3 5 The court made this amazing observation:
"It would seem from an examination of our cases since the Ryan
case that it is neither error to give nor to refuse to instruct the
jury that there is a presumption of due care."3 6
The Ryan case in 1939 overruled prior decisions. The Te Poel case
in 1952 overruled various of the decisions purporting to follow
31.

Moeller v. St Paul City Ry., 218 Minn. 353,16 N. W. 2d 289 (1944).

32. Amundson v. Falk, 228 Minn. 115, 36 N. W. 2d 521 (1949).
33. 236 Minn. 482, 53 N. W. 2d 468 (1952). The case is followed in

Knuth v. Murphy, 237 Minn. 225, 54 N. W. 2d 771 (1952).
34. McCormiclq Evidence 664 i. 4 (1954).
35. 236 Minn. at 493, 53 N. W. 2d at 473. It is interesting to speculate
why the court refrained from listing which opinions it was overruling. I
reject as unworthy the suggestion of some lawyers that the court just enjoys
keeping the bar guessing, and suggest instead this explanation. If the court
was going to overrule any case, it surely wanted to overrule Bimberg v.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co., notes 29 and 30 supra, since it was the first and most
outspoken post-Ryan case holding that the court has discretion to instruct on
presumptions. But the court perhaps realized that it was confronted with an
embarrassing situation, since the Bimberg case, however wrong it might seem
by Minnesota standards, was rightly decided. It was a FELA case, and in
such a case federal decisions, rather than local rules, are decisive as to presumptions affecting negligence. New Orleans & N.E.R.R.v. Harris, 247
U. S. 367 (1918); Note, 37 Corel L. Q. 799, 801 (1952). And it is well
settled by the federal decisions that there is a presumption of due care which
does not vanish upon introduction of evidence to the contrary. Tennant v
Peoria & P.U.R.R., 321 U. S. 29 (1944); Stanford v. Pennsylvania R.R., 171
F. 2d 632, 635 (7th Cir. 1948); Chicago & N.W Ry. v. Graue, 160 F. 2d 820,
825 (8th Cir. 1947); Parga v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 103 Cal. App. 2d 840, 843-44,
230 P. 2d 364, 366 (1951).
36. 236 Minn. at 490, 53 N. W 2d at 473.
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Ryan. What will tomorrow bring? In the Te Poel opinion the court
ventures the observation that presumption "is a subject on which
text writers, teachers of law, and authors of legal articles have
written much and clarified little."8 7 Perhaps a mere practitioner can
be excused for suggesting that the court might well have included
"judges" in that list.
The Uniform Rules on this subject are perhaps not a model of
clarity, but they furnish a more satisfactory standard than have
court decisions. And they would repudiate the absurd rule that presumptions are not to be mentioned in instructions to the jury Rule
14 abandons the long-discredited Thayer-Wigmore doctrine and
turns instead to the more realistic and workable views of Professors
Morgan and McCormick.3 8 It provides that where
"the facts from which the presumption is derived have any probative value as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact,
the presumption continues to exist and the burden of establishing
the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against
whom the presumption operates."
In simpler language, what this means is that if the presumption is
based on probability-as are nearly all presumptions-the jury is to
be told that they may consider the distillation of human experience
which the presumption sums up.
It is overwhelmingly likely that a letter, properly stamped and
addressed and deposited in a mail box, will be delivered to the
addressee. The Post Office may err, but they do so very rarely The
"presumption" that such a letter has reached the addressee is
merely a statement in legal form of this obvious truth. Suppose the
addressee takes the stand and says he never received the letter, and
that there is nothing to contradict directly this testimony Under
the doctrine momentarily in vogue in Minnesota, the judge may
not mention the presumption to the jury, and it is left without the
help of knowing that normal experience is contrary to the addressee's claim. Why in a rational system, devoted to seeking out
the truth, should we deprive the jury of this help, and leave them
instead to argue their own experiences with the mails, if indeed they
realize at all that they may reject as inherently improbable the addressee's story?
"A presumption is a rule which has the effect that from certain
circumstances a certain inference may be drawn. Persons unaccustomed to weighing evidence and particularly persons of
limited intelligence are notoriously suspicious of circumstantial
inferences. Such persons, on the other hand, are prone to be
37 Id. at 485, 53 N. W 2d at 470.
38. For a similar view see companion title by Gausewitz.
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overcredulous of direct testimony. If a party having the burden
of persuasion, then, must rest upon circumstantial evidence to
prove an issuable fact, there is danger that the jury reading
the burden-of-proof charge will mistakenly suppose that the
circumstantial inference, especially if countered by direct testimony, could ,not be 'a preponderance of the evidence.' If the
counsel can find a presumption upon which to rely, and can
secure a charge upon it, he can use it in his argument as a
basis for an explanation which may prevent the case from being
decided upon this mistaken notion."3 9
These propbsitions are illustrated by a case decided during our
court's Ryan phase, Donea v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Instrance Co.40 A seemingly happy husband left his wife one day, leaving
the following note on the kitchen table:
"Dear Kor,
I am leaving for the mountains because I want to be a forest
ranger and I can't seem to get down to brass tacks here. I know
you won't let me go so I am taking this way out. But will write
you and let you know where I am and how I am getting along.
Better move in with ma for the winter.
Love,
Bill."
He was never seen or heard of again. His wife, and the company
which wrote his life insurance, each searched for him. He never
transferred the title to his car, nor took out registration on it in
any other state. He did not register with Selective Service nor with
Social Security. The insurer's missing persons investigators were
unable to locate any trace of him. Seven years after his disappearance the wife sued for the amount of his life insurance policy. In
order to recover it was necessary for his wife to prove that her
husband was dead on August 15, 1943, seven years from the date
of his disappearance. There is a mandatory presumption, based
on probability and the social policy of enforcing family security
provisions such as life insurance and settling estates, that an unexplained absence for seven years and failure to find the person on
diligent inquiry establishes that the person died at some time
during the seven year period.41
But in this case the insurer claimed that the disappearance was
not "unexplained." It pointed to his note as showing that he had
left because he was unhappy with his wife. And it made much of
the fact that a year after his disappearance his wife had obtained
a default divorce claiming cruel and inhuman treatment. It intro39. McCormick, Evidence 668 (1954).
40. 220 Minn, 204, 19 N. W. 2d 377 (1945).
41. McCormick, Evidence 645-46 (1954).
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duced a mortality table to show that most men the husband's age
would not yet be dead.
On this state of the record the supreme court said it was error
to mention the presumption in the charge to the jury. Fortunately
it was able to save the verdict by an adroit argument that defendant
had not made a timely objection to the charge. But could anything
be more absurd than giving this case to a jury which has not been
informed about the presumption. One can imagine now the likely
conversation in the jury room.
"She ought to wait a little longer. I remember reading in the
paper about a guy who was missing for ten years and then
came back."
"Maybe he's in South America. Then he wouldn't have to sign
up for the draft or for social security"
"Didn't you see that ad in the Saturday Evening Post, about
how jurors that bring in big verdicts are raising the price of their
own insurance ? I don't want to do that."
I have a deep faith in the good sense of the American jury But
we do no service to the jury system by compelling jurors to grope
in the dark, unaided by the wealth of experience the law has accumulated over the centuries, and unmindful of the policies which the
law seeks to advance. I believe a jury should be instructed about
presumptions, and that the rules on this subject in the Uniform
Rules of Evidence are desirable and should be adopted.
Only one caveat is necessary It should be made clear that these
rules on presumptions do not affect res ipsa loquitur. Our decisions have told us that this doctrine is nothing more than one form
of circumstantial evidence from which an inference of negligence is
2
permissible, and that it creates no presumption. Thi8 view is
codified by Rule 43.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus it
would not seem to be affected by the Uniform Rules of Evidence,
since Rule 13 of those rules apparently defines "presumption" as
including only what we would call compulsory presumptions, such
as the seven years' absence rule. But there is still danger that res ipsa
might be regarded as a presumption within Rule 14(b), which
concerns those presumptions not based on probability, and which,
under the Uniform Rules, do vanish on the introduction of evidence
to the contrary The Ryan case casts doubt on the distinction be' 43
Professor McCormick deals
tween "inference" and "presumption,
44
with res ipsa loquitur as a presumption. Perhaps most important,
42. Heffter v. Northern States Power Co., 173 Minn. 215, 217 N. W
102 (1927) , Prosser, The ProceduralEffect of Res Ipsa Loquitur, 20 Minn.
L. Rev. 241 (1936), Wright, Minnesota Rules 262-63 (1954)
43. 206 Minn. at 567, 289 N. W at 561 (1939).
44. McCormick, Evidence 643-44 (1954).
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the official Comment to Rule 14 of the Uniform Rules cites a res
ipsa case as an example of a recent decision involving presumptions.
This case is enough to send a cold chill through a plaintiff's lawyer.
In the case in question, a.bridge maintained by a railroad company
collapsed. The court, applying Virginia law, held that when the
defendant offers uncontradicted evidence explaining the accident
and tending to show that it was not due to negligence on the defendant's part, the presumption known as res ipsa loquitur vanishes
and defendant is entitled to a directed verdict.
This would work a revolutionary, and thoroughly undesirable,
change in Minnesota law. Several years ago I represented the
plaintiff in Still v. 7 UJp Bottling Co., a case tried in District Court
in Hennepin County. Wynn Still, a 42 year old painter, entered a
tavern in search of his partner to discuss a business deal. While Still
was standing next to his partner in front of the bar discussing business affairs, a bottle of 7 Up on the back bar exploded. The bottle,
which was there for advertising purposes, was in a glass block which
imitated a piece of ice. The explosion threw glass all around. A piece
of glass hit Still and caused him to lose an eye. Still sued the bar
owner and the smanufacturer of the beverage.
At the trial all the employees of the bar testified as to the usual
custom and practice as well as the procedure with reference to this
specific bottle. The manufacturer would make deliveries through
his employees and would part with physical control of the cases of
7 Up when they were stacked in the basement. From there the bartenders would carry the cases up a stairway into the back bar, deposit them in the refrigerator, and every few weeks change the
bottle in the advertising display. The bottles were not subjected to
any sort of injury or agitation or extremes of temperature.
Chemists testified from an examination of the remaining fragments of glass and from the nature of the "cone of percussion" and
other facts -hypothetically assumed that the explosion resulted from
internal combustion. Officials of the bottler described the process
of manufacture, inspection, bottling and delivery with emphasis on
the impeccable care they employed. The trial court submitted the
case to the jury as against both defendants under the doctrine of res
4
ipsa loquitur, and the jury awarded Wynn Still $28,403.50. "
45. The case was settled while appeal was pending for almost the full
amount of the verdict. Defendant's wisdom in settling was indicated shortly
thereafter when the court held, on very similar facts, that it was error to
refuse to charge the jury as to res ipsa loquitur in an exploding bottle case.
Johnson v. Willmar Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 235 Minn. 471, 51 N. W 2d
573 (1952).
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If the federal case from Virginia, cited with approval in the
Comment to the Uniform Rule, were the law here, defendants could
have had a directed verdict. And if res ipsa loquitur can be brought
within Rule 14(b), the same result will be achieved.
The exploding bottle case is not the only kind of case in which
plaintiffs can recover under existing law but could not recover if
Rule 14(b) governed. I have had occasion to try several derailment
cases for railroad passengers and employees where success was dependent wholly on res ipsa loquitur. A frequent cause of such an
accident is a fissure in the rail. In such a case typically the defendant
will produce evidence showing that the rail was bought from a
reputable manufacturer, that it was made of the very best steel, that
the section crews had maintained the tracks and roadbed with great
assiduity, and that all told defendant had exercised more care than
was necessary On such a record today's law is that the jury must
judge whether the showing of care negatives the inference of negligence arising from the otherwise unexplainable mishap. And this
is what the law should remain.
I believe that the bar generally of Minnesota would vigorously
oppose the adoption of any rule of evidence which might allow a
trial court to direct a verdict for the defendant merely because the
defendant had produced evidence of due care. The weight and
credibility of such evidence should remain for the jury Directed
verdicts in a case of this character lead to such curiosities as Swenson v. Purity Bakmg Co.,46 where there were dead larvae in bread
purchased by plaintiff which had been manufactured, labeled, and
sealed by the defendant. The defendant won a directed verdict by
proving that its precautions were so excellent as to prevent anything
of this kind occurring I The Supreme Court held that the reason the
larvae became imbedded in the loaf of bread was a mystery, ergo, it
could not have happened as a result of defendant's negligence. The
court did have the good sense to write a very brief opinion, stating
that further discussion would serve no useful purpose, which was
certainly true enough. It is decisions of this kind which from time
to time confirm and reinvigorate my confidence in the wisdom and
common sense of the jury
WITNESSES (Rules 17 to 22)

The most important rule concerning witnesses is Rule 20, which
puts an end to old notions that a party is bound by the testimony
of a witness he has called, and may not attack the credibility of such
witness.
46. 183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W 310 (1931).
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An example of application of the old notions is a recent Missouri
case in which the plaintiff introduced in evidence depositions of two

doctors who had examined plaintiff immediately after the accident.
The testimony of the doctors helped plaintiffs case but not as much

as he would have liked. But plaintiff was not allowed to introduce
that part of the depositions which showed that the doctors had been
hired by the defendant, evidence which might have led the jury
47
to suspect bias.

Minnesota has applied this rule even to an extreme fact situation. A young girl was injured when her date drove the car in which
she was riding into a viaduct. In her suit for the resulting injuries
the answer denied negligence and claimed the girl was contributorily
negligeht in riding with him when she knew he was drunk. Whflen

the young man took the stand he was more interested in rehabilitating his romance than in safeguarding the finances of his insurance
company. His testimoiy showed his negligence so clearly that
defense counsel conceded that issue, but they wished to introduce
evidence of his drunkenness. Defendant had testified.

"I was not strictly sober, but nobody could tell I was under the
influence of liquor."
An objection to evidence purporting to show that defendant had

been intoxicated was sustained on the ground that his testimony
could not be impeached or disputed, and this ruling was upheld by
the Supreme Court.48
Though I am glad the girl got her verdict in the case just discussed, the rule applied by the court seems to me utterly senseless.
It has been denounced by every reformer from Jeremy Bentham to
the present time, and is referred to in such scathing terms as "the
remnant of a primitive notion," 49 "no place in any rational system
of investigation in modem society," 50 "nonsense-most regrettably
not simple nonsense, but very complex nonsense," 51 and simply
"foolish."52
47. Conner v. Neiswender, 360 Mo. 1074, 232 S. W 2d 469 (1950).
This ca'se stimulated an excellent article on this whole subject. Keeton,
Proprietorshipover Depondents, 68 Harv. L. Rev. 600 (1955).
48. Vondrashek v. Dignan, 200 Minn. 530, 274 N. IV 609 (1937),
criticized 36 Mich. L. Rev. 688 (1938), and by McCormick, Evidence 537 n.
70 (1954).
49. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 899 (3d ed. 1940).
50. 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 64 (1954).
51. Maguire, Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law 43 (1947).
52. Goodrich, J., in Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 208 F 2d 633. 635
(1953). To the same general effect, in addition to the works cited, see 2 Benthan, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 59 (1827) ; Tracy, Evidence 193 (1952) ;
Ladd, Impeachment of One's Ozn Witness-New Developments, 4 U. ChL L.
Rev. 69, 96 (1936) ; Note, Impeachnent and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in
Minnesota, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 724, 738-42 (1952).
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This archaic rule has been rejected in an important recent
decision by Judge Goodrich. A railroad was sued under a wrongful death act for the death of a person shot by one of its watchmen.
Since there were no living witnesses except the watchman, he was
called by the plaintiff on the judge's suggestion that without his
testimony there was not a sufficient case made out on which the
plaintiff could recover. The watchman admitted the killing but said
that the dead man had attacked him, and that he shot in self-defense.
Defendant claimed that plaintiff should be bound by this uncorroborated story of a witness (with an obvious motive to lie), and that
the verdict for plaintiff should be set aside. But the court refused
to do this, saying in part
"When witnesses were called by a party from among his friends
to act as compurgators it was completely rational that the party
calling them would have to stand by what they said. After all he
chose his friends. But when witnesses are called, in some
stranger's lawsuit, to tell about things they saw, heard, or did,
there is no reason in logic or common sense or fairness why
the party who calls them should have to vouch for everything
they say .
What could be more human than that [Hall] would make
his story show the propriety of his own conduct and the wrongfulness of that of his opponent in the fight. And what would be
sillier than to insist that the jury is compelled to believe all that
testimony which the witness offered in explanation of an intentional killing on his part ?"3
The rule that a party is bound by witnesses he calls no longer
applies in suits under the Federal Employers' Liability Act where
the witnesses are employees of the defendant and must be called
by the plaintiff.5 4 It should be repudiated generally, and Rule 20, in
this regard, makes a much needed improvement in Minnesota law
The Comment to Rule 20 says that the rule is intended to permit
a party to impeach his own witness, but the text of the rule is not so
limited. It would allow examination and extrinsic evidence "for
53. Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 208 F 2d 633, 635-36 (1953). A
great judge has recently reminded us that demeanor evidence "may satisfy the
tribunal, not only that the witness' testimony is not true, but that the truth
is the opposite of his story; for the denial of one, who has motive to (Icily,
may be uttered with such hesitation, discomfort, arrogance or defiance, as to
give assurance that he is fabricating, and that, if he is, there is no alternative but to assume the truth of what he denies." L. Hand, J.,
in Dyer v. MacDougall, 201 F 2d 265, 269 (2d Cir. 1952). And Frank, J., concurring, says
that the plaintiff may satisfy his burden of proof merely by so persuading the
jury that the witnesses were lying and that the truth must be the opposite of
what they said it was.
54. Zumwalt v. Gardner, 160 F 2d 298, 302 (8th Cir. 1947), Chicago &
N. W R. R. v. Grauel, 160 F 2d 820 (8th Cir. 1947), Anderson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 96 F 2d 796 (2d Cir. 1938).
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the purpose df impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness."
The present law in Minnesota is that a party may not support his
witness by introducing prior consistent statements" although in
certain rather ill-defined circumstances he can endeavor to support
the credibility of the witness.5 1 There perhaps can be legitimate
doubt as to the wisdom of allowing the party to support the witness
generally, but under the Uniform Rules the trial judge will have a
broad discretion to regulate such evidence and examination.T The
discretion of the judge is likely to be a more satisfactory guide than
the present rather confused rules, and on the whole in the vast
majority of instances this new concept will not prove harmful but
may indeed be helpful in the ascertainment of truth.
Rule 17 gives the judge power to determine whether a witness
is qualified to testify. It is far better to leave this to the judge than
to attempt to lay down fixed rules regulating qualifications. It is also
discretionary with the judge whether the preliminary exauination
of the-witness for the purpose of determining his qualification should
be in or out of the hearing of the jury. 8
The first sentence of Rule 21 would make a major change in
present Minnesota law" and practice. The proposed rule permits
evidence of the criminal conviction of a witness to attack his credibility only where the crime involved "dishonesty or false statement."
To take a: specific example, kissing a married woman is mighty poor
evidence of dishonesty or false statement, and indeed some might
claim that it should not be classified as a criin nal offense at all. It
would not be admissible under the proposed rule. But a Minnesota
statute 9 has been construed as allowing any crime, whether a great
felony or a petty misdemeanor, to be shown to attack credibility, and
the court allowed a witness to be attacked on this ground where
he had once been convicted of criminal assault because of such an
attempted kiss. 60 The court held that it makes no difference whether
the crnme is one which affects the weight of the witness' testimony,
though it conceded that conviction of some crimes wvill reflect more
55. Tri-State Transfer Co. v. Nowotny, 198 Minn. 537, 270 N. NV. 684
(1936); Note, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Minnesota,

36 Minn. L. Rev. 724, 729-30 (1952).
1
56. Sullivan v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 161 Minn. 45, 200 N. W. 922 (1924),
criticized 9 Minn. L. Rev. 585 (1925).

57. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 45. See McCormuck, Evidence §
49 (1954).
58. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 8.
59. Minn. Stat. § 610.49.
60. Thompson v. Bankers' Mutual Cas. Ins. Co., 128 Min. 474, 478, 151

N. W. 180, 181 (1915).
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on credibility than would conviction of others, and thus it allowed
the nature of the offense to be shown."'
The commentator is right who said that the present Minnesota
rules on this subject,
"have the advantage of being clear and well settled, but the
serious disadvantage
of being founded on no clear and con62
vincing principle."
The simplicity and familiarity of the present law on this point should
not, however, be abandoned merely because another scheme has
more abstract logic to commend it. But perhaps my views are becoming settled and hardened along with my arteries.
The second sentence of Rule 21 would also change Minnesota
law by prohibiting the introduction of previous convictions to attack
the credibility of a criminal defendant unless he has first introduced
evidence of his own in support of credibility 03 My friends who are
experienced in this kind of litigation advise me that this seems
6
a desirable change. 4
Rule 22 makes an important change by rejecting, at least in
part, the notorious rule of Queen Caroline's Case.0 5 The ne'er-dowell George IV had long since become bored with his wife, and upon
becoming king sought to get rid of her by charging her with
adultery The case, which the Queen finally won, caused a tremendous sensation. But today it would be of interest only to the
prurient"8 save for a famous rule of evidence which was invented
during the course of it. The judges of England, in answer to an
inquiry from the House of Lords which was trying the case, ruled
that a witness may not be cross-examined about a prior inconsistent
__ 61. To the same effect is Brase v. Williams Sanatorium, 192 Minn.
304,
256 N. W 176 (1934), where the conviction had been for practicing medicine
without license. The court has also held that the witness can not be asked if
he has been indicted, State v. Ronk, 91 Minn. 419, 98 N. W 334 (1904), or

arrested, State v. Bryant, 97 Minn. 8, 105 N. W 974 (1905) and State v.

Renswick, 85 Minn. 19, 88 N. W 22 (1901), or imprisoned, Harding v. G. N.
Ry., 77 Minn.417, 80 N. W 358 (1899).
62. Note, Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses ti Minnesota,
36 Minn. L. Rev. 724, 735 (1952). McCorrmck, Evidence § 43 (1954) makes

a similar criticism.

63. For the existing law see State v. Silvers, 230 Minn. 12, 40 N. W
2d 630 (1950), State v. Stockton, 181 Minn. 566, 233 N. W 307 (1930),
Note, Ezndence of Defendant's Other Crimes: Admissibility ti Minnesota,

37 Minn.L. Rev. 608, 616-617 (1953).
64. For this, as for the discussion on the accused's failure to take the
stand, I am indebted to a memorandum prepared for me by Joseph M.
Donahue, of the St. Paul bar, who is experienced in this field.
65. 2 Br. &B. 286, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820).

66. Such persons, if any there be among the readers of this Reiew, may

well be interested in the several records of and books about this trial which
the University of Minnesota Law Library has among its extensive collection
of famous cases.
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statement unless the witness has first been shown the statement.
Frequently this. constitutes an undue and serious limitation on "the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,"0'
cross-examinaion. On the other hand, the investigator may have
acquired the written statement by slippery, means, leaving the witness no copy, and may have shaded and distorted its meaning; it is
the investigator, first on the scene and usually from a corporate
source, who has the best opportunity to do this. Frequently fair
play may require that the witness be permitted to read the entire
statement. Hence, as in most evidentiary matters, no inflexible rule
should shackle judicial discretion.
Wigmore, who is better qualified to rank the various absurdities
of the subject of evidence than are most, says of the rule in the
Queen's Case that "for unsoundness of principle, impropriety of
policy, and practical inconvenience in trials" it is "the most notable
mistake that can be found among the rulings upon the present
subject."681The great barristers of Victona's time would not allow
themselves to be so hobbled in getting at the truth, and forced
through a statute repudiating this rule.69
But American jurisdictions accepted the rule unquestioningly,
and none with more zest than Minnesota. Our court reversed a
case where the rule had not been followed, and the lie exposed
without forewarning. Apparently unmindful of the deficiencies of
the rule in the Qiwen's Case, it referred to the cross-examination
as "inquisitorial.!"
Very properly, Rule 22 does not go the whole way in abolishing
this rigid and arbitrary rule. Instead it builds on the middle course
suggested by Learned Hand7 ' and provides that the witness need
not be shown the statement but must, if feasible, be told the time
and place of the writing and the name of the person addressed.
Normally the witness must be given an opportunity while testifying
to identify, explain or deny the statement, but the judge is given
discretion to waive even this requirement, - thus taking care of the
67. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
68. 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1259 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore's exhaustive
analysis of this case, id. at §§ 1259-1264, is the classic treatment of the problem. McCormick, Evidence § 28 (1954) is pithier but just as outspoken.
69. Stat 17 &18 Vict. c. 125, § 24 (1854).
70. McDonald v. Bayha, 93 Min. 139, 142, 100 N. W. 679, 680 (1904).

This is still good law in Minnesota. See Milliren v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 186

Minn. 115, 242 N. W. 546 (1932) ; Note, Impeachment and Rehabilitationof
Witnesses in Minnesota, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 724, 728 (1952).
-71. United States v. Dilliard, 101 F. 2d 829, 837 (2d Cir. 1938).
72. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 22(b).
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unusual case where the contradictory statement is not discovered
until after the witness has left the stand and cannot be recalled.
These proposed rules on witnesses, on the whole, give the witness assurance of fair play and at the same time recognize that the
purpose of evidence rules is to get at the truth, rather than to protect liars. They should constitute a desirable improvement.
PRIVILEGES (Rules 23 to 40)
These rules preserve substantially unchanged those privileges
against testifying which traditionally have been recognized in Minnesota. self-incrimination, lawyer-client, physician-patient, husband-wife, priest-penitent, and the lesser privileges as to religious
belief, political votes, trade and state secrets, official information,
communications to a grand jury, and identity of informer. The
codification is well done and minor questions which may have been
troublesome before are settled.
But on the whole this chapter of the Uniform Rules is disappointing. Here, as in the chapter on hearsay, the draftsmen of
the rules have been content with codification, and have refused to
exercise leadership in reform of the law It is unlikely that anyone
will object to the Uniform Rules on privilege, and the unanimity
with which they will be received is the measure of their failure. The
movement to adopt Uniform Rules of Evidence is a magnificent
opportunity to put an end to absurdities which have no better justification than long usage to commend them. The direction in which
the law of privilege should move is quite well recognized, and by
no one more clearly than Professor McCormick, a member of the
drafting committee
"The manifest destiny of evidence law is a progressive lowering
of the barriers to truth. Seeing this tendency, the commentators
who take a wide view, whether from the bench, the bar, or the
schools, seem generally to advocate a narrowing of the field of
privilege.
One may hazard a guess, however, that in a secular
sense privileges are on the way out."73
I agree that privileges in civil actions are on the way out and
think this entirely desirable. This view has two bases 1. Privileges
are not logically justifiable. 2. From a practical, technical and
startegical standpoint their exercise is harmful to the one claiming
them.
Because more learned commentators have discussed the matter
so well, I shall state summarily the first of these arguments against
privilege. If a privilege is justifiable, it can only be because it protects an interest which is of greater importance to society than ascer73.

McCormick, Evidence 165-66 (1954).
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tainment of the truth in judicial proceedings." The assumption
that these interests require protection at so high a price is unproved;
the value judgment that these interests are of greater importance
than justice is extremely, questionable., 5
In recent years twelve states have passed statutes giving newspapermen a privilege not to disclose the sources of their information.76 The desire of reporters to preserve these confidences does
them honor, but is their sense of honor-or even the putative hampering of a free press which disclosure is claimed to cause"-so
important that we should protect it when to do so may lead to
different results in our courts than would be reached if all the
relevant facts were known? The draftsmen of the Uniform Rules
did not think so, and did not create such a privilege, nor has the
privilege been recognized in Minnesota.
Because privilege for newspapermen is a new idea, we see the
conflicting interests involved, but most jurisdictions have decided
truth and justice are the more important. However with regard
to the traditional privileges, the origins of which are lost in the mists
of antiquity, we do not make such a balancing. We accept them
because they exist, and never stop to ask whether they can be defended.7 8 In my judgment the privileges we know could hardly withstand rational analysis.
This is not to say that we must now turn every secret of the
confessional or the wedding bed into common gossip. It does suggest that we should end the absolute character of privilege, and
leave it to the discretion of the trial judge whether disclosure should
be reqmred. In McCormick's happy phrase.
74. "The suppression of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more
especially when as here the inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be
justified at all only when the opposed private interest is supreme." L Hand.
J.,m McMann v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 87 F. 2d 377, 378

(2d Cir. 1937). And see 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2192, 2197 (3d ed. 1940).
75. For contrary view see companion article, Louisell and Crippen.
76. McCormick, Evidence 166 n. 4 (1954); Note, 36 Va. L. Rev. 61
(1950).
77. There is as yet no proof that the New York Times, published in a
state where the privilege is not recogmzed, is less successful in getting news
than are, say, the newspapers of Montana, where it is.
78. This failure to criticize and analyze rules which have persisted for
a long time is hardly confined to the doctrines of evidence. How many people
really believe that domestic felicity is served by applying an ancient rule to
deny a wife recbvery for personal injuries from her husband's insurance
company? Compare American Automobile Ins. Co. v. Molling, 239 Minn.
74, 57 N. W. 2d 847 (1953) ; Lund v. Olson, 183 Mina. 515, 237 N. IV. 188
(1931) ; Woltman v. Woltman, 153 Minn. 217, 189 N. IV. 1022 (1922), with
Prosser, Torts 673-74, 677-78 (2d ed. 1955).
79. McCormick, Evidence 166 (1954), citing numerous precedent supporting such discretion.
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"If the trial judge is permitted a lee-way, he can prevent those
disclosures of marital or professional secrets which needlessly
shock our feelings of delicacy, but at the same time he can
override these minor amenities when it appears necessary in
order 79
to secure the facts essential to do justice in the case belore
him."

I am speaking, of course, only of civil actions. In criminal proceedings we are confronted by the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, which is but one instance of the sound general
attitude that in a free society it is better to allow truth to stiffer, and
thus to let the guilty go free on occasions, than it would be to adopt
the degrading inquisitorial tactics of the police state. Thus it seems
to me highly undesirable to permit adverse comment on and inferences from the failure of the accused in a criminal case to take the
stand, as the Uniform Rules propose, 0 while prohibiting comment
or inferences where any other privilege is claimed.8 '
It is a truism that a man is presumed innocent until proven
guilty If in defendant's opinion, or that of his counsel, the prosecution has failed to prove the defendant guilty, there is no need or
reason for him to take the stand, and his failure to do so should not
be the subject of derogatory comment. In some cases comment by
the county attorney might mean the difference between a just
acquittal and an unjustified conviction. Reports of the Attorney
General of Minnesota show that in the years 1951-1953 there were
5749 criminal prosecutions in this state. In 5337 of these defendant
pleaded guilty and in 279 was found guilty after trial. In only 133
cases was defendant acquitted. In other words, in 98% of the
criminal cases in this state in that three year period, defendant was
convicted. Even on the obviously false assumption that each of the
2% of criminal defendants who were acquitted was in fact guilty,
the loss of 2% of criminal cases seems to me a small enough price
to pay for the great constitutional rights which our present practice
safeguards. The recommended change would be unnecessary in the
light of these safeguards.
To a certain extent many defendants' lawyers would agree with
my hostility to privileges. They, too, are willing to sing the praises
of truth, and denounce the irrationality of privilege. But their song
is directed at only one privilege, that between physician and patient.
The insurance companies and corporations generally do not have
occasion to go to a doctor, while those who are suing them do so
all too often. The physician-patient privilege may be detrimental to
80. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 23(4).
81. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 39.
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the defendant and can never be helpful. But when any other privilege
is mentioned, defendants' lawyers fall back to their usual position of
favoring all exclusionary rules which may bar the plaintiff from sustaining his burden of proof.
There are obvious weaknesses in the arguments offered in sup-

port of the physician-patient privilege-although I wonder if the
present vogue for psychiatry would not have induced Wigruore to

modify his view that what we-tell our doctor we also tell all our
friends5 2 In a good many years of trying cases no client of mine
has ever claimed this privilege. But evidence reform should depend
on more than whose ox is being gored. The arguments against the
physician-patient privilege differ perhaps in degree but certainly
not in kind from those which can be made against all privileges.
We should abolish, all absolute privilege, and not merely that one
privilege which defendants find objectionable.
I have said that a claim of privilege is harmful, from a practical,
technical and strategical standpoint, to the party making the claim.
This is confirmed by the fact that in my experience there is only one
case where a claim of privilege was ever involved.83 This wa: a suit
under FELA for a switchman who died as a result of a leg amputation. Plaintiff claimed that he had slipped and fallen on snow and ice
on a footboard of a moving locomotive. He was taken immediately
to the office of the railroad doctor for first aid before removal to the
hospital. A priest was summoned, and as he entered the doctor's
dffice he asked the injured man, "Ray, what happened?" The defense objected when the priest testified that Ray said he had slipped
on ice and snow on the footboard. Their rather fantastic claim of
privilege was, of course, promptly overruled.
The trouble ith claiming privilege is that jurors will inevitably
draw adverse inferences from the claim, no matter how much legal
theory there may be to the effect that such inferences are improper.
There have been many cases where I could have claimed privilege, •
especially several that I tried where the plaintiff had syphilis which
was not claimed to be of traumatic origin. Rather than attempt
futilely to hide this fact, I inquired on voir dire whether the potential
jurors would be prejudiced against plaintiff for this reason, and I
referred to it again in the opening statement. In one case, tried in
82. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2380a (3d ed. 1940).
83. The case is McGivern v. Northern Pac. Ry., 132 F. 2d 213 (8th Cir.

1942), the only FELA case in my career in which the plaintiff has ended up
getting nothing. The evidence question discussed in the text was not raised
on appealI
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Minnesota and affirmed by the supreme court,8 4 the testimony between the plaintiff's doctor and the railroad doctor as to whether
there was visible and palpable muscle spasm in the plaintiff's back
was sharply conflicting. With the opposing doctors aligned beside
him, I had the plaintiff, who had active syphilis, strip to the waist
and back up to the jury, and I took the calculated risk of requesting
that some of the male jurors feel his back. When three of them did
so, I felt much relieved, and neither the syphilis, nor the motion
pictures which defendant showed of my plaintiff's activities, " had
any prejudicial effect.
There were cases in which I would have claimed privilege had
the need arisen. In one the plaintiff's family, people of some prominence, did not know her venereal background. Telltale spots showed
up on some X-rays because she had been given mercury and bismuth
in the old days when that was standard syphilitic treatment. Fearing
that the defendants' doctors would become suspicious of the spots
in the pelvic X-rays they had taken, I did not call plaintiff's family
doctor. Had he been called against me, I would have been forced to
claim privilege. But my feeling about this case is not inconsistent
with my general views on privilege. In the case just discussed, the
fact of syphilis years before was of no significance to the result, while
its disclosure would have been immensely embarrassing to plaintiff.
Under these circumstances a judge, exercising the discretion it is
suggested he be given, might be expected to sustain a claim of
privilege.
The physician-patient privilege is insignificant in Minnesota in
personal injury cases, for defendant has a right to a physical examination of plaintiff, and plaintiff waives his privilege by requesting
a copy of the report of that examination." In Illinois state courts the
defendant is not entitled to a medical examination. Yet I have never
refused such an examination of a plaintiff I represented, and upon
mere request will allow defendants to have my client examined by
any and all doctors of their selection at any time or place convenient to them. It is far better to allow the defendant unlimited
medical examinations than to endure the slings and arrows of out84. I refrain from giving the name of the case for obvious reasons.
85. This accords with my usual experience that motion pictures taken
by a defendant of the plaintiff's activities are helpful to the plaintiff's case
and enhance his verdict. Fortunately defendants' lawyers apparently persist in
the opposite view. See the example discussed in Wright. Recent Trends ti
the Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L. J. 409, 423-24 (1956).
86. Minn. R. Civ. P 35.01, 35.02(2). See 2 Youngquist & Blacik, Minnesota Rules Practice 222 (1953). An excellent opinion discussing this waiver
of privilege by Judge Flinn of the 13th Judicial District is quoted in Wright.
Minnesota Rules 217-18 (1954).
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rageous cross-examination or jury argument by the defense.87 And
this proposition may well stand as my general conclusion on privilege.
(Rules 41 to 55)
Easily the most important of the rules in this section is Rule 45,
which gives broad discretion to the trial judge to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it will (1) take undue time, or (2)
create undue prejudice or confusion, or (3) unfairly surprise a
party who had no reasonable opportunity to anticipate it. My first
reaction on studying this rule was one of outrage. It seemed to me
that the lawyers are well able to determine whether evidence is
sufficiently valuable to justify its presentation. When they have
decided that it is valuable and the evidence does not violate any of
the exclusionary rules, it may be thought no business of the judge
to overrule that decision and disallow the evidence.
My reaction was not an unusual one. A principal reason why
the Model Code of Evidence received such a chilly reception from
the profession was that it confided too much to the discretion of the
trial judge.3 8 Rule 45, which seemed to me so distasteful, is essentially identical with Rule 303 of the Model Code.
On further reflection I have modified my views somewhat about
Rule 45. Applied with proper caution it may prove helpful. After
all, it only gives pious and formal expression to what judges have
been doing anyway by calling such proffered evidence irrelevant or
cumulative and repetitious--or "prejudicial." Further, it seems to
me already the rule.in Minnesota. In State v. Haney,)2 the Court
cited Rule 303 of the Model Code with approval, and relied on it,
as well as on earlier Minnesota decisions, for a holding that the
trial court has discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence
if it is too remote or if its probative value is outweighed by the risk
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time,
or (b) create a substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly surprise
the opposing party when he has not had reasonable ground to anticiEXTRINSIC POLICIES APFECTING ADmISSIBILITY

87. While cross-examination and jury argument are prohibited, Mattice
v. Klawans, 312 Ill. 299, 143 N. E. 866 (1924), experienced trial counsel will
always find a way to let the jury know that plaintiff has claimed the privilege.

See also 21 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 181; Harsh v. IlL Termmkl R. R., 351 Ill.
App. 272, 114 N. E. 2d 901 (1953), holding that Federal Rule 35 allowing
a physical examination does not apply in a FELA case in State Court; and
Chicago R. L & P. Ry. v. Benson, 352 IlL 195, 185 N. E. 244 (1933).

88. This history is traced in McCormick, Sone High Lijqhl of the
Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 Texas L. Rev. 559 (1955), and Chadbourn, The

"Uniform Rules" and the California Law of Evidence, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev.
1, 2-4 (1954).
89. 219 Minn. 518, 520, 18 N. W. 2d 315, 316 (1945).
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pate that such evidence would be offered. This is nothing more than
a paraphrase of what is now Rule 45.
It is true that the Haney case was a criminal action-but it
would be highly unusual to allow the judge more discretion in a
criminal case than in a civil action. While the Haney case has not
since been cited on this specific point, perhaps that shows only how
sparingly the power has been used and how rarely it will need to be
used where the parties are represented by capable and experienced
trial counsel.
If procedural law is to be modernized it must be on the assumption that the trial judge will not be incompetent. The comment to
this uniform rule offers "assurance that the result of rare and
harmful abuse of discretion will be readily corrected on appeal."
This is a sorry remedy, which furnishes to the practitioner but
small and cold comfort, but it would appear to be a calculated risk
of the judicial process, which is unavoidable. The power of a trial
judge seems drastic when given verbal expression but it actually
exists today, and so is not novel. One winces, however, in finding
what can happen under the guise of this power to regulate evidence,
for example, the Pennsylvania court affirmed the trial court in forbidding the introduction of mortality tables, on the ground that such
tables would confuse and mislead the jury 0 juries are not so weak,
so readily led astray, that in the name of "protecting" the jury we
should deprive it of useful evidence.
Rule 41 prohibits the receipt of evidence to show the effect of
any statement or similar matter upon the mind of a juror as influencing his verdict. The Comment to this rule says that it adopts
what is "almost universally the law," and it is probably a fair codification of the law today in Minnesota.
Without taking serious issue with this rule, it is noted that in
one of my recent cases a contrary doctrine was applied and its
application was essential to secure approximate justice. On January
29, 1948, Richard Motley was standing beside a slowly moving
freight train near Heavener, Oklahoma, when a tie became dislodged
from a gondola car loaded with ties and came through the side of the
car because of its defective condition, striking Motley in the head,
and throwing him under the wheels. He lost his arm between the
elbow and the wrist. Suit was filed under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act in the state court in Chicago. The action was dismissed
on the ground of forum non conveniens. A new action was then filed
in federal court in Kansas City where the company has its principal
90. McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810 (1926).
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office and place of business and where the president and Board of
Directors meet and where the general counsel and general claim
agent are located. The federal judge in Kansas City, like a lumber
dealer with too many products on hand, transferred the case to
Muskogee, Oklahoma, under Section 1404(a) of the Federal Judicial Code. Plaintiff was handicapped at the trial because the defendant refused to produce its original photographs and statements
of witnesses on the ground that they were in Kansas City and thus
not available-in a suit in Oklahoma. The verdict for plaintiff was
for $15,000, a woefully insufficient verdict in view of the clear
liability and serious injuries.
The jurors were then interviewed. Some jurors refused to
discuss the matter and others refused to sign statements. Five or six
of the jurors, however, gave affidavits on the basis of which plaintiff moved for a new trial. These affidavits, and the testimony of
three jurors who were subpoenaed for the hearing on the motion,
showed that inthe jury room the foreman of the jury, a local automobile dealer, had told'the jurors"
(1) The case had already been tried once and a jury had turned
the plaintiff down in Chicago so why should the Oklahoma jurors
give him another chance;
(2) The railway union had gone up North and hired a shyster
to come down and try the case;
(3) The railroad had been fair and made the fellow a good
offer and he should have taken it.
The only offer of settlement had been for $12,000 but this did
not appear in evidence, nor did it appear in evidence how the foreman.of the jury learned of the settlement offer. After hearing this
testimony the very able trial judge granted a new trial on the ground
of misconduct of jurors as well as other groundsf" The case was
tried again and a verdict of $30,000 was obtained. Although even
this verdict may properly be regarded as inadequate, the consideration of the affidavits and the testimony of the jurors as to what
occurred in the jury room did permit a closer approximation to
justice than the first verdict would have provided.
Rules 46 to 50 deal with evidence tending to prove "character"
or "habit and custom." In general they provide that a person's
"character with respect to care or skill" is not admissible as tending to prove the quality of his conduct on a specified occasion,92 but
91. Examination of jurors as to what occurred in the jury room has
long been proper m the Tenth Circuit, Southern Pac. Co. v. Klinge, 65 F. 2d
85 (1933).
92. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 48.
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that proof of a "habit or custom" may be received for this purpose."
These rules deal with "traits," "habits," and "custom" and they are
confused and jumbled and completely unintelligible. The impact
which these rules will make on Minnesota law is very unclear. One
of the difficulties would stem from a leading case in which defendant's lawyer asked his client if he had ever been in a collision before.
An objection to the question was sustained. The supreme court
affirmed this ruling, saying
"Evidence that a person is of a careful and prudent habit is
to prove that he was not negligent upon a particular
inadmissible
94
occasion."
To the extent that the distinction scholars offer between "character"
and "habit" is understandable," it would seem that the defendant
was endeavoring to show a character trait of carefulness rather than
a habit of not getting into collisions. If this be correct then the
Uniform Rules do not conflict with the decision referred to, but
the case does highlight the murkiness of the distinction and suggests
it would be unworkable in practice. Whether regarded as a trait,
character, or a habit, the evidence should be excluded.
The latest decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court on this
subject involved an action under FELA in which the railroad company was charged with negligence in adopting the custom of carrying mail in the cabs of its enginesY0 Plaintiff, while attempting to
carry such mail and dismount from the cab at the same time, was
injured. The defendant offered to show that over a period of many
years the custom had been in effect and no accidents had been caused
thereby The trial court excluded the evidence, but was reversed
by the supreme court. That court held that evidence of absence of
similar accidents from the same inanimate cause or same customary
practice, was admissible to show that the cause was not dangerous
93. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 49.
94. Ryan v. International Harvester Co., 204 Minn. 177, 182, 283 N. W
129, 131 (1938).
95. See 1 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 92-97 (3d ed. 1940), McCormick,
Evidence § 162 (1954). The official Comment to Rule 50 notes that "it is
sometimes difficult to distinguish" between the two. McCormick supra, at 326
cites this case as excluding "character" evidence.
96. Albertson v. Chicago M. St. P & P Ry., 64 N. W 2d 175 (Minn.
1954), anno. 42 ALR 2d 1044. See also Nubbe v. Hardy Continental Hotel
System, 225 Minn. 496, 31 N. W 2d 332 (1948), and Henderson v. Bjork
Monument Co., 222 Minn. 241, 24 N. W 2d 42 (1946), holding evidence of
absence of other accidents discretionary with the trial judge. The bald statement in Schillie v. Atcheson, T. & S. F Ry., 222 F 2d 810, 817 (1955) that
Minnesota is among the states which admit evidence of this nature, was
not wholly accurate prior to the Albertson case.
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or the customary practice not likely to cause accidentsY 7 There was
no reference to traits, character, or habits as such, but the evidence
involved the absence of accidents from a custom and practice followed by an industry. This provokes some interesting speculation
with reference to the mescegenation of the words "habits" and
"custom" in Rules 49 and 50.
Trial lawyers are far more familiar with the terms "custom and
practice" or "custom and usage."'81 The admission of such evidence
in negligence cases harks back to the oft-quoted principle graphically
expressed by Justice Holmes:
"What usually is done may be evidence of what ought to be
done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable prudence whether it usually is complied with or not.""'
Here again the rules of evidence should not depend upon whose
baby gets the measles. The fact that the defendant, whether through
luck or skill, has avoided any accidents in the past, falls far short
of showing or tending to show that he was not careless on the
present occasion. Likewise, the fact that the plaintiff, whether
through bad luck or negligence, has been involved in an accident
or accidents in the past, furnishes no safe or proper guide to what
happened on the particular occasion. The subject of "accident
proneness" should remain in the field of psychology for the time
being. 0o
Rule 51 states the well settled common law rule that remedial
measures taken after an accident may not be shown to prove negligence in connection with the accident. Of course, this is subject to
the usual exceptions that they may be introduced in order to show
the feasibility of preventive measures, where this is an issue, or to
explain a photograph made or view had after the repairs, or to
10
show that the injurious effects disappeared after the change. '
97. It is settled that evidence of other accidents from the same inanimate
cause is admissible. The latest case is Mockler v. City of Stillwater, 74
N. W 2d 118 (Minn. 1955).
98. A late Minnesota case approving such evidence is Ahistrom v.
M nneapolis, St. P., S. S. Marie Ry. Co., 68 N. W 2d 873 (Minn. 1955).
99. Texas & P. Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 468, 470 (1903) ; Terminal
R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis v. Schorb, 151 F. 2d 361 (8th Cir. 1946), holding
that custom or practice, where merely evidentiary, of the presence or absence
of negligence, may be admitted and need not be pleaded. Cases are there
cited distinguishing this situation from those where custom is relied on in
the law merchant as a binding rule or as constituting a part of the contractual obligation.
100. E.g., James and Dickinson, Accident Pronenessand Accident Law,
63 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1950) ; Blain, The Automobile Accident-A Medical
Problem, 3 J. Crirn. Psychopathology 37 (1954) ; McCormick, Evidence 326

(1954).
101.

These are ably discussed in McCorrmck, Evidence § 252 (1954).
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(Rules 56 to 61)
Before a witness may give an opinion as an expert, under
Uniform Rule 56(2),102 as under present Minnesota practice, the
judge must find, among other things, that the opinion requested
is within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or
training of the witness. This is substantially the definittion given
by most authorities, but that of my worthy opponent from St.
Paul is more expressive. 0 3 In the usual case this is a matter for
the trial judge. But here, as elsewhere, it is possible for the trial
court to abuse its discretion by applying erroneous standards. Thus
a trial judge who refused to allow expert testimony except on the
part of those who have scholastic standing in the particular field
would be guilty of an abuse of the discretion confided to him by this
rule. As an eminent court has pointed out,
"Testimony of a country doctor concerning the sanity of hits
patient is as readily admissible
as the testimony of the most
4
EXPERT AND OTHER OPINION TESTIMONY

renowned psychiatrist.''

Rule 58 takes note of the persistent, and justified, criticisms of
misuse of hypothetical questions,"0 5 by leaving it to the discretion of
the judge whether to require questions calling for the opinion of an
expert witness to be stated in hypothetical form. Where the judge
has not so required, the expert can give his opinion without specifying the data on which he bases it, although he may be required to
specify this data on cross-examination.
There is nothing novel about this rule so long as it is applied to
102. For further treatment of this rule, see companion article by Ladd,
p. 441.
103. Ray A. Cummins of St. Paul. Although it was years ago, I
acutely remember the definition he used against me in jury argument.
"An expert is one who testifies,
And who then registers mild surprise
When everything he said was true
Is found to have been otherwise,
But nonchalantly files his claim
And collects his fee just the same."
104. Bratt v. Western Airlines, 155 F 2d 850, 854 (10th Cir. 1946) The
subject of utilizing modern science in reconstructing accident causes, particularly with reference to vehicle collisions, is discussed by the author with appropriate citation of authority, Law, Science and the Expert Witness, 24 Teni.
L. Rev. 166 (1956).
105. Learned Hand, with his usual vividness, refers to the hypothetical
question as "the most horrific and grotesque wen on the fair face ofjustice."
New York Bar Association, Lectures on Legal Topics 1921-22 (1926). Wigmore finds it "so obstructive and nauseous that no remedy short of extirpation will suffice." 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 686 (3d ed. 1940). And McCormick
calls it "a failure in practice and an obstruction to the administration of
justice." McCormick, Evidence § 16 (1954). Numerous other comments, In
the same complimentary vein, are quoted by Wigmore and McCorniek at the
place cited. For future treatment of this rule see companion article by Ladd.
p. 447
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experts who have examined the plaintiff, or the land in question, or
who otherwise have first-hand knowledge of the subject matter on
which they are asked for an opinion. But hypothetical questions are
today required in Minnesota where the expert has no such firsthand knowledge, unless he has heard the evidence.100 These doctrines were laid down in ludependent School District No. 35 v.
A. Hedenberg & Co.: 107
"...1
[T]he rule requiring the statement of hypothetical facts
to an expert witness has no application to questions calling for
the conclusion of one who has personal knowledge of the subject of the inquiry. If the witness is acquainted with the facts of
the case-that is, if he has personal knowledge or has made
personal observations-he may give his opinion upon the basis
of his knowledge and observation in response to direct interrogation."
The present rule seems to be unobjectionable, and it covers most,
though far from all, expert testimony in personal injury cases, where
the experts are usually doctors who have examined the injured
person. And there is no objection to permitting examination of other
experts without using the hypothetical form. It would seem reasonable to permit examination of the following kind:
"Do you have an opinion as to .. ?"
"On what data have you based this opinion?"
"What is the opinion ?"
"What are the reasons for your opimon?"
Careful lawyers would disclose the basis for the opinion even if
Rule 58 were to be adopted. Otherwise the jury will wonder how the
expert reached his conclusion, and the wise attorney will not be
content with a mere statement of an opinion unsupported by an indication of the facts on which it rests. The most skeptical juror is the
one who is asked' to accept something on faith or authority without
having the process of reasoning explained to him whereby the conclusion was reached.
Thus the permission to defer any specification of the basis for
an opinion until cross-examination would not often be used. If it
were attempted, the judge would usually intervene and require
statement of the supporting data which the rule permits him to do.
But on the whole this seems to be a proposal which cannot be useful,
and which might conceivably be dangerous. The rule should be
changed by limiting it to its opening provision which dispenses with
the requirement that the question be hypothetical in form.
106. Of course where the expert has heard the testimony of other
witnesses he may be asked a hypothetical which merely requires him to assume
that testimony to be true rather than setting out m detail the assumed facts.
107. 214 Minn. 82, 97, 7 N. W. 2d 511, 520 (1943).
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Rules 59 to 61 would allow the trial judge to appoint an expert
of his own, with the fee of this expert to be borne by the parties. 108
These are the only provisions of the Uniform Rules to which I am
unalterably opposed. No experienced person can doubt that there
has been much abuse in the employment of expert witnesses. And
the remedy here suggested has had considerable support in scholarly
circles. 10 9 Nevertheless it is contrary to basic principles about the
adversary nature of litigation.
These rules provide that the judge may tell the jury that lie
has appointed the expert "as relevant to the credibility of such
witness and the weight of his testimony "110 The effect this would
have was well summarized by the Michigan Supreme Court in holding unconstitutional a similar, though more limited, statute which
would have permitted the court to appoint experts in honicide
cases
4"
[I]n the face of the certificate of character, fitness, and
ability given to the court experts by the court, experts summoned by either side would receive but scant consideration at the
hands of the jury, their testimony would be swept aside in a
breath."' 1 '
This is but a particular example of the fundamental truth that any
indication of the
"attitude of a judge can, and almost universally does, effectively
112
influence and guide a jury's verdict."

Although the rules purport to allow the parties to call other experts
of their own,"1 3 they might just as well save their money The
testimony of the court-appointed expert will be accepted as gospel,
while any other expert testimony will be sound and fury, signifying
nothing.
Here we are confronted with an anomaly One of the principal
108. For further treatment of this rule see companion article by Ladd,
p. 450.
109. E.g., National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, Model Expert Testimony Act (1937), American Law Institute, Model
Code of Evidence §§ 403-10 (1942) , 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 563 (3d ed.
1940) , McCormick, Evidence § 17 (1954) , Beuscher, Expert Witnesses,
[1945] Wis. L. Rev. 593, see also, 15 Minn. L. Rev. 350 (1931).
110. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 61.
111. People v. Dickerson, 164 Mich. 148, 154, 129 N. W 199, 201
(1910). Similarly strong statements are made in an opinion finding it reversible error for the court to appoint a witness. People v. Scott, 326 II. 327,
157 N. E. 247 (1927). The constitutionality of a statute allowing the court
to appoint experts in criminal cases was sustained in Jessner v. State, 202
Wis. 184, 231 N. W 634 (1930).
112. Kalodner, J., dissenting in United States ex rel Darcy v. Handy,
224 F 2d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. granted 350 U. S.872 (1955). Judge
Kalodner quotes many similar statements by the United States Supreme Court
and other courts.
113. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 59.
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supporters of the scheme which these rules would codify is Wigmore. Yet even Wigmore would not support proposals that only
court appointed experts could testify"
"... first, because it interferes with the constitutional and traditional right of the parties to adduce such evidence as they think
useful; and secondly, because it would commit the fate of such
issues completely to a body of men who, under certain local
political conditions, would be wholly unreliable, 1and
the new
4
state of things would often be worse than the old.'
If it would be unconstitutional and undesirable to allow testimony
only by the court-appointed expert, can it be permissible to allow
testimony by this expert and others, when everyone realizes that
the testimony of the other experts will be ignored by the jury?
This comes dangerously close to suggesting that we are free to strip
away the substance of constitutional rights so long as we are careful
to preserve the empty forms. As a practical matter trial judges are
not equipped to select experts of superior integrity and wisdom,
although the jury would not know this.
There is a tendency in all human thought for outsiders to credit
a profession with more precision and certainty than it in fact
possesses. We are all well acquainted with the fickleness and the
vagaries of the law, but when someone comes along and states
what purports to be a "finding" of science or medicine, we accept
it uncritically. In the trial of lawsuits we frequently find experts
from these fields lined up on either side in sharp conflict. Undoubtedly some of these conflicts come from the willingness of certain "experts" to tailor their conclusions to the needs of the side
that has hired them. Doctors and scientists, no less than lesser men,
too often adhere to the principle that he who pays the piper calls the
tune. But surely we cannot suppose that all experts are dishonest.
In the great bulk of cases the disagreement among experts comes
from an honest difference of opinion on matters about which science
or medicine cannot be sure.
Perhaps the jury is not ideally equipped to resolve scientific controversies. Possibly a panel of scientists would be a more appropriate
forum to hear such disputes. But if the idea were presented to us in
that form, we would reject it unhesitatingly. For by the same token,
a judge or a group of trained fact-finders might do a better job in
evaluating credibility of lay witnesses, and in passing on such questions as negligence and causation. Yet our people have preferred,
rightly I think, to entrust themselves to the common sense of a
114. 2 Wigmore, Evidence 648 (3d ed. 1940).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.
Vl 40:301

cross-section of the community And even science should not be
immune from an occasional application of common sense.
"Trial by jury is no litmus test for finding what is trite or false
but it is the system which we have."" 5
Unless we are prepared to abandon the jury system entirely t "O we
can hardly justify stripping it of a part of its historic function by
turning to a court-appointed "expert" the solution of issues which
have hitherto been for the jury
HEARSAY EVIDENCE (Rules 62 to 66)
It would be a waste of time for me to say much on the general
theory of our rules about hearsay All three of the great modern
masters of evidence have examined this problem in infinite detail,
and they are fairly well agreed on the analysis which should be
made." 7 First-hand testimony, properly subjected to cross-examination, is the best kind of evidence we can have, and is always to
be preferred. But our preference for the best should not lead us
always to exclude the second-best if that is all we can get. Thus
we cannot say-and indeed our law never has said-that all hearsay
is to be excluded. Whether or not to allow hearsay must depend
upon how badly we need the evidence and on how trustworthy it
seems. The 31 exceptions to the hearsay rule recognized in the
Uniform Rules"18 are merely the hardening of common sense j tidg115. Johnson v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 208 F 2d 633, 636 (3d Cir. 1953)

For a forceful statement as to the superiority of common sense over opinion
evidence, see Miami Coal Co. v. Luce, 76 Ind. App. 245, 249, 131 N. E. 824,
826 (1921).
116. I think it more than mere coincidence that one of the earliest
articles to propose court appointment of expert witnesses also suggested for
its ideal scheme: "Cases will be heard not before a lay jury which may or
may not be swayed by the lawyer's bag of emotional tricks, but by a tribunal
of two or in some cases three judges." Elliott and Spillman, Medical Testimony in PersonalInjury Cases, 2 L. & Contemp. Prob. 466, 467 (1935). More
recent authors have not been so frank to concede that their proposal is iconsistent with the jury system.
117 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 8(c) (3d ed. 1940), 5 id. § 1427, McCormick, Evidence §§ 300-5 (1954), Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the
Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177(1948).
118. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(1)-31). The Uniform Rules on
hearsay are searchingly examined by Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 43 (1954). Except as discussed in the text tile
highlights are. the use of depositions taken in the present suit, without showing
that the deponent is unavailable; admission of declarations made while the declarant was actually perceiving the event or condition described, extension of
the use of dying declarations, made while the declarant is conscious of impending death, to all kinds of actions, the admission of declarations against
interest without showing unavailability, and embracing declarations, not only
against material interest, but also those acknowledging civil or criminal liability or affecting interests of price or prestige, admission of a patient's
declaration of his past pain or symptoms when made to a doctor employed
with a view to treatment; the use of business records without proving that
the employees participating in the making of the record are unavailable the
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ments over the years that in those 31 particular situations the need
and the trustworthiness of the kind of testimony offered was sufficient to justify its admission. But with hearsay, as with other questions of procedure, these questions of need and trustworthiness are
much better gauged by the trial judge, in the stark light of-the
realities of the particular case, than they are by a committee or a
legislature setting out fixed rules. A simple example will show the
trdth of Professor McCormick's observation that:
"Much worthless evidence will fit
the categories, much that is
9
vitally needed will be left out.""11
A railroad switchman lies dying beside a track. From the nature
of his injuries it is impossible to tell whether he was struck by a
mail hook protruding from a passing train, or whether he was
assaulted by criminals. The railroad is liable for his death only if the
first explanation is true.1 2 0 Suppose that before he expired the
switchman said: "I was hit by a mail hook." Will someone who
heard this statement be permitted to testify as to it? The statement
will be admissible as a dying declaration if it was made "while the
declarant was conscious of his impending death and believed that
there was no hope of his recovery."''- " Or it will be admissible if it was
made soon enough after the accident to be part of the res gestae, a
wonderful Latin tag which has done marvels in confusing the law.
But are these really all that we should consider in determining the
need and the trustworthiness of the statement?
Suppose four other men on the switching crew saw the switchman receive his injunes. Do we then have the same showing of
need that we would have if he was hurt while off by himself? Or
suppose a litigation-wise fellow worker had prefaced the dying
switchman's statement by saying to him, "You know, Jim, your
wife and children won't collect a thing from the railroad if you were
slugged by some crooks; they can only recover if you were hit by a
mail hook." Wouldn't this bear on the trustworthiness of the statement?
From this it should'be clear that I disagree with the traditional
approach to hearsay wuch says broadly that it is inadmissible and
then sets up a number of iron-bound exceptions. Under the ill-fated
admission of official reports made by officers who did not observe the facts
but who had a duty to investigate the facts and report their findings; and the
use of a judgment of conviction of a felony to prove any fact essential to

sustain the judgment. (Rule 63.)

119. McCormick, Evidence 626 (1954).
120. Though the facts are based on the celebrated case of Lavender v.
Kurn, 327 U. S. 645 (1946), in that case there was no statement by the
deceased.
121. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 63(5).
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Model Code of Evidence hearsay was admissible if the person who
said it was unavailable at the trial, or if he was present for crossexamination,122 but this was subject to the power of the judge to
exclude the evidence if its probative value was outweighed by its
potential to confuse or mislead the jury 123 And of course when hearsay was admissible under this rule it was for the jury to decide how
much weight to give it.
This extremely liberal hearsay rule is thought to have been responsible for much of the opposition to the Model Code, and the
Uniform Rules have chosen to take a much more conservative
course. They have preserved the traditional pattern of a hearsay
rule with specific exceptions, although the exceptions are much
liberalized over those now in force. Perhaps this will enhance the
chances for adoption of the Uniform Rules, although I somewhat
wonder if traditional codifications which fail to offend anyone do
not also fail to arouse any very enthusiastic support from anyone.
Procedural reforms can lose out just as readily from the disinterest
of their friends as from the disagreements of their enemies.
Turning now to the specific provisions of Rule 63, which is the
key rule on hearsay, perhaps the most interesting of the exceptions
is the first one. This incorporates Wigmore's view that a previous
statement made'by a person who is present at the trial and available for cross-examination should be admissible. 124 Probably there is
not a court in the land which today would admit such a statement.
And our court disagreed with Wigmore in a famous opinion by
Justice Stone in which he sought to demonstrate the unsoundness
of Wigmore's arguments.'2 5
My support of this proposal is tempered by the realization of
how unrealiable some of these prior statements by the witness arc.
It is also conditioned that the proponent of the statement be required to call the witness, if available, cross-examination being thus
122. American Law Institute, Model Code of Evidence, Rule 503 (1942),
and see the discussion, id. at pages 217-24.
123. Model Code of Evidence, Rule 303. Rule 45 of the Uiiform Rules
is substantially identical.
124. 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 n. 2 (3d ed. 1940) , "The orthodox view

was approved in the first edition of this Treatise. Further reflection, however,

has shown the present writer that the natural and correct solution is the one
set forth in the text above." Other writers have accepted this view McCormick, Evidence § 39 (1954), Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 192-96 (1948). Falknor,
The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 43, 49-55 (1954),
accepts the principle but would limit it more stringently than do the Uniform
Rules.
125. State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 285 N. W 898 (1939). A pointby-point answer to Justice Stone's arguments will be found in McCormick,
Evidence 81 (1954).
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guaranteed to the adversary, and that the trial judge be given discretion to withhold writterL-.statements from the jury room. The
claim agent for an insurance company or a railroad does not enjoy
a very high reputation for.the accuracy of the statements which he
produces. Thus Judge Guy K Bard, a federal district judge, says:
... [T) here seems to be an assumption by most of the bar that
any statement made or taken down immediately after the accident occurs is, of course, a true statement. I am a great admirer
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When those special
agents take down any statement from any witness or party, and
give a report in court, I generally find it to be correct. I am sorry
I cannot
say the same for the claim agents of certain corpora12 6
tions."'
And McCormick quotes what he calls an "able and experienced
Texas district judge" for the proposition that often persons who are
not accustomed to being witnesses
"are taken advantage of by hardened and experienced claim
agents of- insurance companies and other concerns, and are
caused to sign written statements that really do not represent
their true notions of the occurrence about which they have made
statements. When there is an issue in court as to whether or not
this has happened, then we have to take all the facts and circumstances of the particular matter under consideration, and more
often than not the subsequent statement of the witness is more
reliable"' 2 7
With this recognition of the unreliability of such statements, which
could be documented with a hundred examples from my experience.
why should we change the law of evidence to make such statements
admissible?
As distinguished from official reports, business records, news
bulletins, etc., statements taken by clain agents are notoriously unreliable; they should never be allowed to be introduced as substantive evidence merely because the witness has been produced in the
court room but not called to the stand by the proponent or merely
because the witness is "unavailable." Recent perception by the
witness is an absurd guarantee of trustworthiness.
The answer, it seems to me, is first to make such statements subject to pre-trial discovery as a matter of absolute right; second, to
guarantee the right of cross-examination, and tlird, to prohibit
them from becoming exhibits which can be taken to the jury room.
Then their admissibility with these conditions might well be left
to the trial judge who, in the limited area remaining, should be the
126. Symposium: The Practical Operation of Federal Discovery, 12

F. I. D. 131, 156-57 (1951).
127. McCormick, Evidence 76 n. 13 (1954).
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final arbiter as to their need and trustworthiness. As so limited the
proposed change will make little difference in practice.
Let's imagine an example in order to see the possible effect of
the rule. At 2:30 on a dark and snowy morning a young railroad
switchman, working in the yards, is killed when a train working on
the next lead track backs into him. By 3:30 the railroad claim agent
is there and has photographed the scene and taken statements from
the witnesses.32s As the issue later develops, the railroad is liable if
the engine on the next track failed to have its backup light on, as required by rules of the Interstate Commerce Commission. When the
engineer on that other train testifies at the trial, he says he did not
have his backup light on. If the proposed Rule 63 (1) were the law,
the railroad could then introduce as substantive evidence the statement it took from him immediately after the accident in which he
says, in writing, "The backup light was on."
The statement by the engineer was taken much closer to the
time of the accident than his testimony in court, and undoubtedly
the defense attorney would argue to the jury that it is for that
reason a more reliable account. But consider some of the possible
explanations for the variance between statement and testimony
An hour after the accident takes place the engineer is still shocked
with the realization that he has killed a man. His natural instinct
is to try to persuade himself and others that it was not his fault. But
if the backup light was not on, it would have been his fault. Isn't
this going to induce him to say that the light was on? Again, failure
to have the light on would violate ICC rules and might cost the
engineer his job. Is he likely to admit this failure to the claim agent
or his employer?
If the statement is untrue for either of these reasons, we may
be much more likely to have the truth at the trial, where the engineer
knows he will be cross-examined severely if he lies, where he may
subject himself to a perjury prosecution, and where there is the
administration of an oath with whatever effect that may have on
sensitive people. The stern visage of the judge and the wary eye
of the cross-examiner may produce truth from a witness who will
lie to a clama agent. But statements taken by claim agents are unreliable even where there has been no deliberate lying. The persuasive powers of claim agents are very great. Imagine the following
colloquy in the small hours of the tragic night.
128. Though the facts of this example, and the prompt appearance on

the scene of the claim agent, are taken from the record of one of my recent
cases, the statement supposed m the text is purely imaginary.
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"John, was your back-up light on?"
"I don't think so. I don't remember turning it on."
"Well, it's important that we find out. You usually have your
back-up light on, don't you ?"

"And you know that the rule requires you to have it on, don't
you?"
"Yes, I know about that."
"Well, then, you must have had it on tonight, mustn't you ?"
"Gee;I can't remember turning it on."
"But even if you can't remember, John, since you do usually
have it on, you probably turned it on tonight, didn't you ?"
"Yes, I guess I did."

Claim agents' statements do not treat us to such revealing questions
and answers. Instead the claim agent will write out the statement

with the flat assertion, "The backup light was on." And John will
sign the statement.
But while this may sound like very dubious evidence to be
admitted,.the remedy is for plaintiffs' lawyers to show by examination of the engineer and by argument why the early statement was
inaccurate. There are risks here, but they are risks which are present today. For even under today's rules, the statement could be
used by the railroad to impeach the engineer. Use in this way makes
it just as necessary for plaintiffs' lawyer to show that the witness is
telling the truth now and that the statement is inaccurate as he
would have to do if the statement were admitted in evidence. So
long as the engineer testifies on the stand that the backup light was
out, plaintiff has made a sufficient case to go to the jury. Trial
lawyers know that juries rarely heed instruction that they are to
use the extra-judicial statement only as bearing on the credibility
of the witness and not as substantive evidence. Where an inconsistent statement is used for impeachment, we must explain or demolish it, and the proposed rule will make no great practical change.
There may be times when the early statement will be of real value,
and the rule is sound in allowing it in for such cases. Suppose that
the engineer doesn't mention the backup light to the claim agent,
but that in a fair and honest statement to my investigator, made
without duress of any kind, he says he didn't have the light on.
By the time of trial the railroad has made it clear that testimony that
the light was off will not be viewed favorably by the engineer's
employers. I call him expecting him to testify honestly in accord
with his statement, but his fear of the company induces him to say
that the light was on. There is no other evidence that the light was
off. Under today's rules plaintiff would not be entitled to go to the
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jury, but under the proposed rule, the early statement would be
substantive evidence in my favor, and it would then be for the good
by both
sense of the jurors, aided by examination of the engineer
129
sides, to decide which time he was telling the truth.
There is an interesting aspect to this Rule 63(1) which the
scholars seem to have overlooked. The notorious doctrine of Hickman v Taylor,"" and its codification in more drastic form in the
make statements obtained by witnesses in
Minnesota Rules,'
preparation for trial immune from discovery And it has been held.
under the Federal Rules where this question is relevant, that the
fact that the statement was taken close to the time of the accident
and that the opportunity to talk to the witnesses or to take their
depositions does not arise until many months later when the plaintiff has secured an attorney, is not "good cause" for allowing plaintiff to inspect these statements. 32 If the statements are now to he
usable as evidence rather than merely for purposes of impeachment, can their immunity from discovery any longer be justified ' ""
And if we premise an evidence rule on the teachings of psychologists
and of common sense that the statement nearest in time to the event
is likely to be the more truthful,3 4 can we preserve a discovery rule
which rejects this premise? I am for adoption of Rule 63(1) of the
Uniform Rules of Evidence as above explained and limited and also
129. An example of a case in which allowing substantive weight to the
prior inconsistent statements of a witness aided a court in permitting a jury
to reach a just verdict on the fourth trial of the case is Kulp v. Chicago, St.
P., M. & 0. Ry., 102 F 2d 352 (8th Cir. 1939)
Robert J. McDonald first tried this case in 1936. At that time tie children,
some of them little tots, were in the court room. When the author finally collected the last verdict, after the Supreme Court of the United States denied
certiorari fifteen years later, the "little tots" were in the NavyI Are cotirts
really slow and do they really need to be reformed?
130. 329 U. S. 495 (1947). In Hudalla v. Chicago, M., St. P & P R. R..
10. F R. D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950), it was held that plaintiff in a FELA action
may not examine statements given by him to the defendant railroad or statements obtained by the railroad from other of its employees, in the absence
of a showing of "special or exceptional circumstances." Id. at 365. This decision
seemingly overrules the earlier rule in the district as laid down in Blank v.
Great Northern Ry., 4 F R. D. 213 (D. Minn. 1943).
131. Minn. R. Civ. P 26.02, criticized in Louisell, Discover' and PreTrial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 633, 635-39 (1952).
132. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F 2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949). and cases
cited at 4 Moore's Federal Practice 1141-45 (2d ed. 1950). But cf. Brown v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 17 F R. D. 324 (S.D. N.Y. 1955), Wright,
Recent Trends in the Practical Use of Discovery, 16 NACCA L. J. 409,
418-20 (1956).
133. "It seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should
provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case." Jackson, J.,
in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U. S. 495, 515 (1947).
134. McCormick, Evidence 75-76 (1954), cites numerous cases and
psychological writings in support of this view.

19561

A PLAINTIFF'S VIEWY

for deletion of the final sentence of Rule 26.02 of the Minnesota
Rules of Civil. Procedure.
Rule 63 (4) (c) is all that remains of the Model Code's permission of hearsay whenever the person who made the statement is unavailable as a witness. It allows statements by unavailable witnesses
if they (1) narrate, describe or explain an event or condition, and
(2) were made when the person had "recently perceived" the event
and while his recollection was clear, and (3) were made in good
faith prior to the commencement of the action. This rule would seem
to adopt for all cases the principles laid down by our Court in
Jacobs v-. Village of Buhl."5 A policeman returning from his rounds
told another officer that about 45 minutes earlier he had fallen on the
steps of the public library. At that time the policeman did not seem
to be excited, nor did anyone realize the injuries were serious. But
in fact the fall aggravated a pre-existing condition and caused his
death. The Court held that his statement about the fall was admissible for workmen's compensation:
"A consideration not to be disregarded in passing upon this case
is the fact that there was an entire lack of motive for the deceased to misrepresent at the time he told of having received the
injuries. His injuries did not appear at that time to be serious.
Death from his injuries was probably the last thing he was thinking about. It is doubtful if at that time he had the least thought
in his mind that'his injuries would even require an application
for compensation..
"It is natural that an injured person, would be occupied and
absorbed by 'the experience of his recent injury and that he
would make a statement relative thereto to the first fellow
employee that he happened to meet. Such a declaration would, in
the ordinary run of life, be accepted as a true statement of what
occurred. We should not set up technical rules to 'exclude as
evidence what would be accepted as true in the ordinary run
of life."'136
The opinion could have been interpreted either as liberaliziig the
rules of evidence generally or as laying down a special rule for
workmen's compensation cases.137 It has never since been relied on
by the Supreme Court as authority for this point except in workmen's compensation cases, and the Court's latest mention of it
135. 199 Minn. 572, 273 N. W. 245 (1937).
136. Id. at 577, 579-80, 581-82, 273 N. V. at 247-48, 249, 250. The case
is criticized at Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391, 405 (1938), on the ground that the
court should have left this reform to the legislature. It is praised by McCormick, Evidence 584 (1954), as "the kind of judicial enlargement of existing evidence law to meet emerging needs that offers the best promise of survival of the common law system."
137: Note, 22 Minn. L. Rev. 391 (1938) sets forth arguments on both
views.
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seems to explain it on this basis. 88s But the principles laid down
by the Court are as persuasive for common-law actions as for
workmen's compensation, and Rule 63(4) (c), extending these
principles to all actions, would be a desirable advance.
If all of these situations in which the Uniform Rules would
allow statements to be introduced as substantive evidence were
where the witness is unavailable under Rule 63(4) (c), or where
the witness is present and available for cross-examination under
Rule 63(1), the judge should have power-and should frequently
exercise the power-to prohibit taking these statements into the
jury room. If these statements are regarded as exhibits which the
jury may take with them they will have an effect much greater than
the same testimony would have were it given on the stand. Thus,
for example, if a witness resides outside the state and is, therefore,
not subject to subpoena, the lawyer who obtained a favorable statement from him could introduce the statement and show that the
witness was unavailable and introduce the statement if it otherwise
met the test of Rule 63(4) (c) Four other witnesses might testify
orally contrary to this witness' statement, yet their testimony would
not be taken to the jury room and might well be forgotten by the
jury And every lawyer knows that having the statement in the
jury room is just like having the witness in the jury room talking
to the jurors, with the additional advantage that he cannot be crossexamined. The statement, if it were regarded as an exhibit, could
go to the room and have great effect with the jurors. For this
reason a safeguard in this respect is recommended.
Indeed the only provision of Rule 63 to which I have serious
objections is 63(31) which allows treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets on history, science or art as substantive evidence of their
contents if the court takes judicial notice or an expert witness
testifies that the publication is a "reliable authority in the subject."
This would change Minnesota law considerably Like every other
state except Alabama, 139 Minnesota refuses to allow learned treatsies
to prove the truth of the statements they relate,'1 40 and even prohibits
138. Chilstrom v. Trojan Seed Co., 65 N. W 2d 888, 895 (Minn. 1954)
139. Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, 29 Ala. 558 (1857). Alabama experience with this rule, which apparently has been favorable, is relied on in
support of the proposed rule by Dana, Admission of Learned Trcatiscs in
Evidence, [1945] Wis. L. Rev. 455. A Massachusetts statute permits this use
of learned treatises in malpractice cases, apparently on the theory that
this is the only way plaintiff can get any evidence to support his cause.
Mass. Ann. Laws, c. 233, § 79C, discussed in Note, 35 B. U. L. Rev. 542,
550-52 (1955).
140. The latest expression is in Briggs v. Chicago, G. W Ry., 238 Minn.
472, 491, 57 N. W 2d 572, 582 (1953) "[I]f this kind of evidence were ad-
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their use on cross-examination of an expert if he accepts the work
as an authority only "reluctantly. 1' ' No gain and much loss might
arise from this proposed change in our settled practice. On this
point I am going to agree with an experienced railroad attorney,
since appointed a federal judge, who wrote:
"Those in the profession who have been actively engaged in the
trial of personal injury cases of various kinds have learned that
the generally accepted ideas and beliefs of the medical profession change rapidly from time to time. Concepts which have
been accepted for years are suddenly disproved or new theories
are adopted. Doctors are as prolific with writings as rabbits are
with young. Some of their treatises seem to be as hastily conceived." 4 2
There is no point in converting a lawsuit into a battle of treatises.
CONCLUSION

An interesting and provocative discussion- of the need for law
reform may be found in the recent book by Chief Justice Arthur T.
Vanderbilt. 4 3 This need has 'been highlighted by recent articles
written by prominent judges advocating abolition of the jury system in negligence cases.14 4 Absent reform we may drive litigants
to arbitration or administrative tribunals, or the professors may
win in their program to commit accident cases to some form of
social "loss" insurance in lieu of the orthodox judicial process.143
Procedural reform was instituted in this state by the adoption of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Uniform Code continues the
trend to endow the trial judge with broad discretionary powers so
necessary if we are to avoid the stupid flood of reversals for evidentiary rulings and errors in the court's instructions. Each of the
proposed rules must be studied and evaluated by two criteria:
mitted, a party could find a textbook which supported his case and, by

introducing it or a part of it in evidence, he would have a witness in the
jury room on his side of the case even though such witness had not been
under oath and had not been subject to cross-examination."
141. Zubryski v. Minneapolis St. Ry., 68 N. W. 2d 489 (Minn. 1955),
39 Minn. L. Rev. 905 (1955).
142. Grubb, Proposed "Learned Treatises" Rule, [1946] Wis. L. Rev.
81, 86.
143.
144.

Vanderbilt, The Challenge of Law Reform (1955).
Honorable Jerome Frank, Soinething's Wrong ath Our Jury Sys-

tein, Collier's; December 9, 1950; Honorable Samuel Hofstadter, Let's Put
Sense in the Accident Laws, Saturday Evening Post, October 22, 1955.

145. Ehrenzweig, Negligence Without Fault (1951) ; James, Sodal Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N. Y. U.
L. Rev. 537 (1952); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing
Capacity, 61 Yale L. J. 1172 (1952); McNiece and Thorton, Automobile
Accident Prevention and Conspensation, 27 N. Y. U. L. Rev. 585 (1952);

Feezer, A Circle Through'Negligence,27 1. Y. U. L Rev. 647 (1952).
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(1) Does it aid in the discovery and establishment of truth?
(2) Does it simplify and clarify the law?
The Uniform Rules of Evidence seem generally desirable. In
some places it would be better to preserve a well-understood Minnesota practice rather than accept change merely for the sake of
change or an "illusory"uniformity with other states. The principal
section which adopts a policy with which I do not agree authorizes
the court to appoint its own expert witnesses, which seems to me undesirable in policy so long as we retain the adversary system. On
the whole, modified to Minnesota needs by a discriminating committee, these rules could greatly improve the calibre of our courts
as instruments for ascertaining the truth. We have such an agency in
the Supreme Court's Advisory Committee. But even after the
Advisory Committee has done its job and the Rules in perfected form
are adopted, we will not have completed the necessary reform in the
evidence law of Minnesota. The ultimate change which is necessary
is for the courts, in their application of these rules, to follow the
principle laid down years ago by the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals
"In viewing a trial as a sporting event in which only the parties
have any interest, the rule might be adhered to, like one of the
rules of any game. The purpose of a trial, however, is to seek
for and, if possible, find the truth and to do justice between the
parties according to the actual facts and the law, and any rule
which stands in the way of ascertaining the truth and thus
hampers the administration of justice must give way 14
146. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F 2d 325, 332

(8th Cir. 1936), quoted with approval in Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v.
Kulp, 102 F 2d 352, 358 (8th Cir. 1939).

